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ABSTRACT   
 
 
IS THERE A PLACE FOR SEXUAL DIFFERENCE IN ERNESTO 
SPINELLI’S EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY? AN 
IRIGARAYAN RESPONSE TO THE WORK OF ERNESTO SPINELLI 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Aloysius Joseph 
 
December 2007 
 
 
 
Dissertation supervised by Suzanne Barnard, Ph.D. 
My critique begins with the philosopher-psychoanalyst Luce 
Irigaray’s claim that all inter-subjective relations are subtended by 
sexual difference, and that forgetting this is ignoring a foundational 
aspect of human relations. For Irigaray, sexual difference is not 
mediated by biology or some ontological difference that culture 
identifies as “man” or “woman,” but a particular relation to the body 
and to language that structures inter-subjectivity. I draw from the 
work of Ernesto Spinelli, as he is a contemporary scholar-practitioner 
of existential phenomenological psychology who is particularly attuned 
to the constitution of inter-subjectivity in therapeutic praxis. I began 
with Spinelli’s critique of contemporary psychotherapy as “an ally of 
dominant cultural assumptions” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 18). Using 
Irigaray’s psychoanalytic and deconstructive reading of Western 
 v 
metaphysics, I demonstrate that Spinelli’s theory and practice actually 
reinforce certain cultural assumptions concerning sexual difference. 
This blind spot in his praxis prevents Spinelli from realizing certain 
inter-subjective possibilities in his work with clients; namely, the 
possibilities afforded by articulating a sexually specific other. I arrived 
at this conclusion based on my analysis of his theory and practice vis-
à-vis an Irigarayan understanding of sexual difference. My analysis 
showed that he fails to listen to the sexuate nature of embodiment in 
his therapeutic praxis. Using Irigaray, I suggest that Spinelli’s 
existential psychotherapy can benefit from paying attention to a 
perceptual and a sensory economy in therapy that is rooted in the 
client’s sexuate body and history. Such a nuanced attunement will 
allow the therapist to look for creative ways to “spatialize perception 
and make time simultaneous” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 155) in therapy. I 
propose that by paying attention to a different economy of language 
subtended by an Irigarayan understanding of sexual difference, 
Spinelli’s version of existential psychotherapy will not only be 
revitalized, but will also continue to challenge the cultural 
assumptions of our time.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
The question of sexual difference 
 
Sexual difference is probably the issue in our 
time which could be our ‘salvation’ if we 
thought it through. 
                                                                        - Luce Irigaray,  
         An Ethics of Sexual Difference, p. 5 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In a report on the film industry, titled “The Princess Paradox,” 
James Poniewozik (Time, April 5, 2004) points out, “Hollywood’s 
newest Cinderella stories seek to inject some feminist messages into 
the age-old fantasy” (p. 72) of every girl’s desire to be a princess. 
Poniewozik’s observations are based on movies like The Prince and Me 
(Martha Coolidge, 2004), Ella Enchanted (Tommy Haver, 2004), Shrek 
2 (Andrew Adamson & Kelly Asbury, 2004), and A Cinderella Story 
(Mark Rosman, 2004). He defines the celluloid Cinderella in the 
following manner:  
[T]o succeed on both the feminist and the fantasy 
level, the new Cinderella has developed rules and 
conventions as strict as a Joseph Campbell 
template. She should be pretty, but in a class-
president way, not a head-cheerleader way. She 
should be able to stand up for herself (recall the 
Crouching Tiger moves of Shrek’s Princess Fiona). 
She must be socially conscious – a result, says Meg 
Cabot, author of the Princess Diaries books, of 
Princess Diana’s charitable work. And she should 
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above all not want to be a princess – at least until 
she changes her mind.  In Diaries, Prince and Ella, 
it’s not the girl who must prove herself worthy of 
princesshood; princesshood must prove itself 
worthy of the girl…. You just need a feisty girl, a 
prophylactic dose of skepticism and a fabulous ball 
gown – about which no ambivalence is necessary. 
(2004, p. 74) 
 
The injection of feminist messages into the age-old fantasy/ideal of 
girls becoming princesses is not, it seems to me, a paradox but simply 
a clever and opportunistic reworking of the age-old patriarchal fantasy 
of what a girl should become: a princess. This reworked fantasy 
integrates qualities such as equality, beauty, and social consciousness 
into the process of becoming a princess, with the condition that 
Cinderella still falls in love with a man and goes to the ball. This 
strategy of simply decorating the patriarchal ideal of 
woman/femininity with a few feminist accessories not only works via 
its seductive appeal for many girls and women, but also because the 
roles played by women in Hollywood’s new Cinderella stories, are not 
(as Jacobson, a top Disney executive observes) “toxic or repellent to 
men” (Poniewozik, 2004, p. 74). For example, women are portrayed as 
powerful but willing to forfeit their power to reap the rewards of 
traditional femininity. Both Poniewozik and Jacobson’s observations 
point to the reality of patriarchal fantasies continuing to haunt and 
delimit what constitutes woman. 
Although overlooked by many in psychology, the influence of the 
media on cultural values and norms associated with femininity cannot 
and should not be ignored. The media influences cultural practices by 
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incorporating patriarchal ideals into the images of femininity; it 
additionally influences the images of men that are offered up to 
women as “desirous,” and the heterosexual, “masculine” desire from 
which women are encouraged to see and experience themselves. 
Because these images have persisted to varying degrees over time, the 
underlying structure of phallocentrism appears to remain 
unchallenged in many important ways. 
 
1.2 Phallocentrism and sexual difference 
Phallocentrism can be understood as the use of one particular 
model of subjectivity – the male subject – as the norm by which “all 
others are positively or negatively defined” (Grosz, 1989, p. 105). The 
masculine as the central term defines meaning and social relations. 
So, for instance, difference within social relations is understood in 
male or phallic terms. In this phallocentric economy, women for 
example, are seen as lesser than men (“penis envy”) and are seen to 
experience a lesser or ineffective way of knowing (“they are emotional”) 
than men. Because patriarchal ideals and fantasies remain 
unchallenged within a phallocentric structure, the question of sexual 
difference – in other words, the acknowledgment of two sexes, two 
bodies, two forms of desire, and two ways of knowing – gets eclipsed. 
By the use of the word, “eclipsed,” I am drawing from the literary 
meaning of the term as used to describe the astronomical event that 
happens when one celestial object moves into the shadow of the other. 
The overshadowed object does not cease to exist, but is hidden from 
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view. When sexual difference is understood in phallocentric terms, the 
term “woman” becomes secondary, marginalized, eclipsed. In the 
absence of a non-phallic understanding of sexual difference (difference 
understood as pure difference, difference not in relation to a pre-given 
norm), what it means to become woman continues to be measured 
against a “neutral” (gendered masculine) subject. As a result, the 
opportunity to rethink the former on its own terms becomes forfeited. 
The sad consequence is that the story of what it means to be woman 
continues to be rewritten as “his-story.” One of the most important 
“his-torical” influences in the Western philosophical legacy inherited 
by modern psychology is the work of Renè Descartes. In the following 
section, I will address the link between the Cartesian legacy and 
sexual difference.  
 
1.3 Cartesian legacy and sexual difference 
The term “Cartesian” denotes certain important elements of the 
modern philosophy of Renè Descartes, particularly those arguments 
he deploys towards reconciling the philosophical problem of the 
subject’s apprehension of the object. My interpretation of Descartes’ 
philosophy is influenced by the work of existential phenomenologist 
Hans Cohn (1997). In his book, Existential Thought and Therapeutic 
Practice: An Introduction to Existential Psychotherapy (1997), he 
succinctly outlines the Cartesian legacy. Descartes employed a 
method of radical doubt; that is, he systematically doubted everything 
in the world. His aim was to arrive at something that was absolutely 
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certain, the existence of which could not be doubted, in order to build 
a reliable system of knowledge. Through this method, he arrived at 
one and only one thing that could not be doubted: his own thinking. 
This conclusion is encapsulated in his statement, “Cogito ergo sum” (I 
think therefore I am), where the cogito is consciousness, self, the 
thinking thing (res cogitans). As the cogito needs nothing else to exist, 
the body (res extensa) becomes expendable and superfluous.  
By separating the mind from the body, Descartes established 
the ground for a reliable system of knowledge; however, Western 
metaphysics also paid a significant price with the separation of the 
mind from the body. This means that anything that is other to the 
cogito suffers the same fate; that is, while the cogito and all that it 
stands for is privileged, anything other than the cogito suffers the fate 
of becoming marginalized. 
In her book, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, 
Elizabeth Grosz (1994) discusses the price paid by the body in 
Western metaphysics as a consequence of the privileging of the mind 
over the body. She observes, “The body either is understood in terms 
of organic and instrumental functioning in the natural sciences or is 
posited as merely extended, merely physical, an object like any other 
in the humanities and social sciences” (p. 8). While the reduction of 
the body to the position of an object is, in and of itself, philosophically 
problematic, it also impacts the status of whatever else gets 
represented by the body. Within the Cartesian economy, the subject’s 
relation to the body becomes instrumental; the body serves as a 
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conduit or vessel for the subject in its various projects. In its role as 
conduit, the body is constituted as a passively resistant object which 
requires animation for the subject’s projects; its constitutive role in 
the process of knowing is elided.  
The Cartesian split also carries implications for sexual 
difference. This is so because “woman” and the feminine have been 
associated with the body and embodiment since the beginning of 
Ancient Greek philosophy. Philosopher and psychoanalyst Luce 
Irigaray (1985a) critiques Descartes’ treatment of the body as res 
extensa as yet another installment in this philosophical compulsion 
toward repetition of “the same.” It should be noted that the Cartesian 
economy of mind-body relations is in line with the Platonic-
Augustinian tradition of aligning “higher” functions to the “soul” and 
the “lower” functions to the “body” and that by subjugating the latter 
to the former, sameness and stability was insured.  
Irigaray addresses Descartes’ work from the perspective of 
subjectivity vis-à-vis sexual difference. Pointing out the many 
consequences of what it means to be woman within the Cartesian 
framework, she notes, “The ‘I’ thinks, therefore this thing, this body 
that is also nature, that is still the mother, becomes an extension of 
the ‘I’s disposal for analytical investigations, scientific projections, the 
regulated exercise of the imaginary, the utilitarian practice of 
technique” (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 186). The body’s association with 
nature not only within the Cartesian framework, but also within 
certain interpretations of Freud, and the body’s association with the 
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mother (as being more corporeal, more natural because of her link to 
reproduction and biology), continue to justify social inscriptions of 
women as objects to be used, controlled and/or domesticated. Within 
this Cartesian metaphysical structure, “woman” belongs to the side of 
the “other” – disposable, expendable and superfluous – while “man” 
takes the subject position as the cogito – certain, necessary and 
indispensable. Grosz (1994), as well, notes the close parallel between 
the Cartesian split of the mind and body and the male/female 
opposition:  
The male/female opposition has been closely allied 
with the mind/body opposition. Typically, 
femininity is represented (either explicitly or 
implicitly) in one of two ways in this cross-pairing of 
oppositions: either mind is rendered equivalent to 
the masculine and body equivalent to the feminine 
(thus ruling out women a priori as possible subjects 
of knowledge, or philosophers) or each sex is 
attributed its own form of corporeality. (p. 14)  
 
The link of the female with the body comes with a price for 
women: loss of subjectivity and reduction to the position of the object. 
Within such an economy, when women are linked to their bodies, 
what it means to be woman gets coded in biological terms, which in 
turn restricts her role within the social and economic orders. For 
example, when women are seen as naturally linked to reproduction 
and maternity and/or assumed to be prone to “hormonal” 
irregularities, their suitability for roles that are thought above all to 
require “rational judgment” and authoritative presence (e.g. the 
Presidency, or the Head of the Armed Services) is rendered suspect. 
Thus, the reduction of women to the position of objects and, hence, 
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the “objectifying” representations that emerge within such orders, is 
based on seeing women as being closer to their bodies than men. 
Such a positioning of women is also coextensive with patriarchal 
claims that link women’s “affinity” to the body with women’s 
“weakness” – women are seen as more susceptible to the vicissitudes 
of the body – to biological cycles, to psycho-somaticization, to 
difficulties separating and/or maintaining “clear boundaries.” The 
implications of such alliances are that for man to be man, he needs to 
disavow the body and its affiliations. The Cartesian split perpetuates a 
perception of the body as a product of a raw, brute, passive nature 
that needs to be civilized and polished by culture. The body is seen as 
an impediment or an obstacle, instead of as a cultural interweaving 
and reciprocal production of the “subjective” and the “natural.”   
Grosz (1994) observes that the implications of such patriarchal 
(and misogynist) views gained strength from the belief that “women’s 
bodies are presumed to be incapable of men’s achievements, being 
weaker, more prone to (hormonal) irregularities, intrusions, and 
unpredictabilities” (1994, p. 14). This misogynist thinking sanctioned 
patriarchal myths and practices that attributed the purely conceptual 
order to be the prerogative of men. Women were therefore deemed 
unfit to enter the conceptual order and, by extension, the social and 
political orders, due to their proximity to the body. Their role (as 
objects) was to satiate the corporeal needs of men. Men’s corporeal 
needs are often disavowed and projected on to women.  
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Thus with the advent of the Cartesian split, based on the 
disavowal of nature/body/woman, a symbolic division was 
introduced. This division allocated the cultural, intelligible and the 
“transcendental” to the masculine and the material, corporeal, 
sensible, and “natural” to the feminine. With this symbolic division, 
women are severed from their own becoming as they are prevented 
access to culture. This loss of subjectivity, resulting from the link with 
the object and the body, has produced consequences for women 
within the biological, interpersonal, religious and social realms. For 
instance, the oppression of women was based on the biological 
justification that their capacity of either bearing or raising children 
makes them less able to engage in the social roles that are virtually 
granted to men at birth. In the essay, “When Descartes met the fitness 
babe: Academic Cartesianism and the late Twentieth-Century Cult of 
the Body,” Leslie Heywood (1999) observes that the preoccupation of 
women with their bodies within the contemporary culture (evidenced, 
for example, in the proliferation of low-fat diets, weight loss programs, 
gym memberships, liposuctions, etc.) is one manifestation of the 
legacy of Cartesianism. Heywood argues: 
If, as an inheritor of the canonical Western 
tradition, she (woman) internalizes a worldview that 
is male … [she] almost cannot do otherwise than 
develop a preoccupation with her body, since that 
body has made her the negative other of culture. 
(1999, p. 273)  
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Positioned as the “negative other” of culture, she will continue to 
subjugate her body through strict control and mastery in order to live 
up to her internalized (male) worldview.  
In the next section, I take up how the existential 
phenomenological tradition confronted the problematic of the 
Cartesian tradition, particularly the inheritance of the Cartesian 
subject and its implications for the mind-body division. I also discuss 
the similarities and differences between existential phenomenology 
and the psychoanalytically-informed philosophy of Irigaray in terms of 
their understanding of embodiment vis-à-vis the motif of sexual 
difference.  
 
1.4 Existential phenomenology and sexual difference 
Existential phenomenology developed out of the critique of 
Cartesian metaphysics posed by, thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, 
Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. While 
their emphases and styles of thought diverged in important ways, 
their philosophies all challenged the pervasive and prevalent model of 
the Cartesian subject, particularly in its disembodied, de-
contextualized and universal aspects. To begin with, existential 
phenomenology underscores the significance of the fact that the 
subject who doubts is always already embodied. Luijpen and Koren 
(1969) explicate this concept, of a corporeal interrelatedness of “mind,” 
“body,” and “world,” as follows: “Without the body and the world, 
however, the subject is not what he is, a human subject; the subject 
 11
needs what he himself is not – the body and the world – in order to be 
a subject” (1969, p. 33). Since mind and body always already exist as 
a meaningful and interrelated event, the Cartesian attempt to 
(re)connect them is redundant. One implication of this discovery is 
that the foundational mode of relationship is not one of knowledge but 
of existence; however, existence is given to us in and through lived 
experience. Existential phenomenologists focus on the articulation of 
embodied lived experiences and attempt to establish the conditions of 
possibility for the experiences to emerge as a series of meaningful and 
interrelated events. 
What is common to Existential Phenomenology and Irigaray’s 
psychoanalytically-informed philosophy is that both are curious about 
the subject’s place within the imaginary. While I will elaborate on this 
term later (as understood within the psychoanalytic discourse), for 
now, the term imaginary can be understood as follows: while always 
already structured by language and discursive practices, the 
imaginary is rooted in the subject’s relationship to an image of his/her 
body. Both Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray are interested in the pre-
discursive experience of the subject (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 130; 
Irigaray, 1993a, p. 151), as the articulation of lived experience is 
always already infused by specific meanings existent in culture. The 
term prediscursive experience refers to the moment before logic-bound 
language frames the meaning of the experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, 
p. 10-14). Both are interested as well in understanding how and why 
certain subject-relevant cultural meanings become dominant, while 
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others remain latent. While existential phenomenology, however, 
acknowledges the social, political, historical and cultural engendering 
of the subject, it typically neglects to address the particular 
significance of embodied sexual difference and its constituting role. In 
other words, existential phenomenology fails to recognize that the 
factors constituting our lived experience are themselves derivative of a 
collective and shared discourse that is framed by a phallocentric 
economy of relations. To illustrate this, I will explore a statement from 
the praxis of Ernesto Spinelli, a leading existential phenomenological 
therapist, whose praxis I will examine in depth in my subsequent 
chapters. In the context of attending to one of his patient’s anxiety 
about growing old, Spinelli states, “How each of us deals with our 
death anxiety is likely to be as varied and unique as our experience of 
being alive” (1997, p. 10). While this assumption is valid from an 
existential phenomenological perspective, it overlooks the fact that the 
“experience of being alive” is different for men and women, beyond 
simple “individual difference,” but is marked by our “sexuation.” By 
the use of the term “sexuation,” I refer in part to the constitution of 
the body, which should “not evoke a precultural, presocial, or 
prelinguistic pure body but a body as social and discursive object, a 
body bound up in the order of desire, signification, and power” (Grosz, 
1994, pp. 18-19). I would also add that this term characterizes our 
taking up a position as a subject vis-à-vis the symbolic order (that 
which governs our inter-subjective relations). If our sexuation is 
“inherited” (e.g. the manner in which I gesticulate with my hands, 
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brought to my attention by a family member, is an unintended, 
embodied identification with my father) then it is crucial to develop a 
critical understanding of how and/or what is handed down to us.  
Existential phenomenologists describe inter-subjectivity as if it 
is constituted through our embodied subject’s interaction with 
another embodied subject of the same kind, overlooking the sexually 
specific differences of the two subjects – both sensory and 
morphological. This means that existential phenomenologists describe 
and analyze the experience of an embodied subject not as an 
experience of a concrete other, but as an abstraction based on the 
morphology of the male sex. In this regard, Irigaray’s 
conceptualization of the imaginary goes further than that of the 
existential phenomenologists. Margaret Whitford (1991) observes that 
Irigaray conceptualizes the imaginary in terms of sex, either male or 
female. More specifically, she points out that for Irigaray: 
[T]he imaginary either bears the morphological 
marks of the male body, whose cultural products 
are characterized by unity, teleology, linearity, self-
identity, and so on or it bears the morphological 
marks of the female body, characterized by 
plurality, non-linearity, fluid identity and so on. 
(1991, p. 54) 
 
Thus by overlooking the sexual markings on the imaginary and lived 
experience, existential phenomenology colludes with phallocentrism. 
For Irigaray, though, sexual difference is fundamental in exploring the 
cultural imaginary. 
In the next chapter, I will elaborate on Irigaray’s understanding 
of the relationship between the imaginary and lived experience, and 
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how each bears the morphological marks of the male or the female 
body. I will also examine what such markings mean in relation to 
subjectivity and sexual difference. 
 
1.5 Luce Irigaray and the question of sexual difference 
For Irigaray, the question of sexual difference is a major 
philosophical issue. In her words, “Sexual difference is probably the 
issue in our time which could be our ‘salvation’ if we thought it 
through” (1993a, p. 5). According to her, ignoring the question of 
sexual difference amounts to privileging the masculine. Irigaray’s 
interest in, and critique of, the problematic of sexual difference 
demonstrates that the Western cultural imaginary is haunted by the 
specter of phallocentrism, a specter which threatens to suffocate the 
space for any inter-subjective communication. To her, it is more 
important to question the materials out of which the cultural 
imaginary is constructed than it is to question the cultural 
construction of subjectivity itself. In other words, for her, only when 
the cultural imaginary is re-conceptualized vis-à-vis sexual difference, 
can it positively affect the lives of men and women. In this sense, 
Irigaray’s style and critique of Western thought situates her within the 
tradition of post-structuralism (Berg, 1991; Weedon, 1997). 
Poststructuralist thought holds the view that any study is itself 
culturally conditioned and therefore not free from preconceptions and 
prejudices. For instance, to understand the meaning of a text, it is 
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necessary to not only study the text itself, but also critically examine 
the contexts and the systems that came together to produce the 
specific meaning that shows itself. To this end, in the next section I 
examine the role post-structuralism plays with regard to the study of 
underlying structures in relation to sexual difference and Irigaray’s 
own unique contribution in this tradition. 
 
1.6 Irigaray and poststructuralist critique  
Poststructuralist thinkers like Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, 
and Luce Irigaray have critiqued Western metaphysics, finding in 
particular, its “blind spot” in seeing/thinking the problems of sexual 
difference. Lacan critiques the Western metaphysical subject as being 
indifferent to its sexual difference, Derrida (1973) critiques the 
concept of presence in Husserl’s phenomenology rendered through his 
critique of the “masculine” properties of the voice, and Irigaray (1985a) 
critiques the gap in the “symmetry” posited between the sexes in 
Sigmund Freud’s account of femininity. In my analysis, however, Luce 
Irigaray’s critique of Western metaphysical texts does more than 
articulate the sexual de-centering of the subject, the privileging of 
masculine presence over feminine absence, and of the masculine 
gender over the feminine. She presents positive articulations of female 
embodiment that avoid essentializing sexual difference and gender. In 
addition, she offers a systematic and detailed rethinking of the 
conditions that would make it possible for women to have “a home in 
the symbolic order” (Whitford, 1991, p. 156). Finally, she presents 
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psychosocial and politico-economic structures within which sexually 
different subjects can engage in communication without neutralizing 
each other. 
In her writings, Irigaray observes that although there are two 
sexes, only the masculine has a place in Western metaphysical 
thinking. She points out that within the Western metaphysical 
economy, the feminine is rendered incapable of representation on its 
own terms and remains foreclosed. As she states, “The ‘feminine’ is 
always described in terms of deficiency or atrophy, as the other side of 
the sex that alone holds a monopoly on value: the male sex” (Irigaray, 
1985b, p. 69). When the feminine is invoked, it is usually subjected to 
a phallocentric economy and thus gets reduced to a poor copy or 
imitation of the masculine. To illustrate her fundamental critique of 
Western metaphysics, I will turn to her critique of Sigmund Freud, 
articulated in her groundbreaking work, Speculum of the Other Woman 
(1985a). In the first section of this book, Irigaray examines “the blind 
spot of an old dream of symmetry.” She analyses what constitutes 
“normal womanhood” in Freud’s theory of sexuality. Her analysis 
reveals that Freud’s construction materials are based on his 
assumption that “anatomy is destiny.” That is, for Freud, woman’s 
lack of a penis evokes in her the desire to want to have something that 
the man has. This desire/lack will “form the basis for ‘normal 
womanhood’” (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 49). In the final analysis, according 
to Irigaray, “sexual pleasure boils down to being plus or minus one 
sex organ: the penis. And sexual ‘otherness’ comes down to ‘not 
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having it’” (1985a, p. 52). According to Irigaray, this mistake of 
Freud’s phallic-centered economy of overlooking the sexual specificity 
of what it means to be woman is the “blind spot of an old dream of 
symmetry.” The old dream of symmetry stems from the patriarchal 
fantasy that women (as poor imitations of men) can become women 
only by striving to become the masculine phantasy of the feminine. 
For instance, in the beginning of the twentieth century, many women 
attempted to free themselves and reclaim their full humanity through 
adopting the masculine ideal of success. 
 
1.7 Rationale for critiquing Ernesto Spinelli 
Ernesto Spinelli is one of the most influential existential-
phenomenological scholar/practitioners in contemporary therapy. 
Through his seminars, lectures and writings, Spinelli has earned an 
international recognition as an innovator in both theory and practice. 
He has been in private practice in London for more than two decades, 
and is also a clinical supervisor. He works as a Senior Fellow at the 
School of Psychotherapy and Counselling, Regents College, and has 
published several books and articles addressing aspects of existential 
psychotherapy, including his most recent book, Practising Existential 
Psychotherapy: The Relational World (2007). Through his praxis, 
publications, and coaching programs, Spinelli contributes in a 
significant manner towards the ongoing development of existential 
phenemenological psychotherapy. 
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In choosing Spinelli’s work as an exemplar of existential 
phenomenology, I am motivated by several factors. First, he goes 
beyond an articulation of the fundamental theoretical concepts that 
constitute existential phenomenology, also attempting to clarify “what 
it might be like to engage in (an existential phenomenological) 
therapeutic relationship” (1997, p. 4). Hence, he provides case 
material and first person narratives that illuminate how existential 
phenomenology informs his own personal practice. My in-depth 
reading of his work shows that his knowledge and expertise as an 
existential phenomenologist is thorough and systematic. Furthermore, 
his “practitioner narratives” provide an important resource in 
understanding the workings of his imaginary in relation to the real of 
sexual difference as it emerges in the therapeutic relationship. Also, 
my choice of Spinelli is influenced by his openness to current 
developments in the intellectual world. He acknowledges that 
existential phenomenological therapy’s recent developments “have 
been greatly influenced by hermeneutics, narrative theory, and post-
structuralism” (1997, p. 5). In this context, he observes that the 
developments in existential phenomenological therapy via such 
influences “should make it plain that its ideas provide a significantly 
different means of examining and dealing with the wide range of 
problems that provoke people to seek the services of a therapist to 
those which infuse most other contemporary therapeutic models” 
(1997, p. 5). Spinelli’s acknowledgment regarding existential 
phenomenological psychotherapy’s current influences frees it from 
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being elitist and insular. His openness towards other influences 
prompts me to state that existential phenomenological therapy can 
also benefit from a critique from the perspective of sexual difference 
and feminist thought as conceptualized by Luce Irigaray.  
Irigaray is also an active practitioner of psychotherapy, and she 
too writes about her experience as a psychoanalyst as a means of 
building psychoanalytic theory. In addition, both Spinelli and Irigaray 
work as phenomenologists – exposing latent (or forgotten) conditions 
of possibilities for what shows or appears. However, while Spinelli’s 
articulation of existential phenomenology is clinically useful for 
understanding the processes involved in a given psychotherapeutic 
encounter, his work is devoid of any direct reference to sexual 
difference. Specifically, Spinelli does not explore the lived reality of 
what it might be for a woman to become other than what she is 
normatively assumed to be. Based on this omission on his part, we 
could infer that he has inadvertently colluded with the dominant 
cultural assumptions about what it means to be woman. If that is the 
case, perhaps his own critique of today’s psychotherapy as becoming 
“an ally of dominant cultural assumptions rather than one of culture’s 
most trenchant critics” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 18) could be aptly applied to 
his own understanding and application of existential 
phenomenological psychotherapy. 
Spinelli does attempt to articulate what it means to be a human 
subject in the context of a sexual relationship. Invoking Merleau-
Ponty’s arguments regarding embodied consciousness, Spinelli 
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elaborates by saying, “Sexual encounters provide us with a pivotal 
means with which to express our presence to ‘the other’ and, in turn, 
to express the presence of ‘the other’ to ourselves” (2001, p. 82). While 
he recognizes sexual encounters as “pivotal” in the understanding of 
the subject’s relationship to the other, he remarks that Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s interest in sexuality is not about “issues of male or 
female sexuality, sexual orientation or the sociopolitical dimensions of 
sexuality” (2001, pp. 82-83). Spinelli’s remark that the meaning of 
sexuality belongs to the “inter-relational dimensions” suggests that 
the inter-relational and the sociopolitical are ultimately unrelated. 
Correlatively, Spinelli’s failure to address the specificity of female 
sexuality anywhere in his texts implies he assumes a normative 
conceptualization of female sexuality. Such an assumption on 
Spinelli’s part might lead to a clinical exploration of women’s 
sufferings only in the context of their personal histories and not in 
relation to cultural ideologies. If existential phenomenology is about 
the exploration of inter-subjective possibilities of a given way of being, 
then drawing from a cultural imaginary grounded on patriarchal 
fantasies produces only a monologue, one which can only satisfy the 
exigencies of the male subject.  
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1.8 Irigaray’s sexual difference and Spinelli’s existential 
phenomenological psychology 
Hence we arrive at a place from which to understand both the 
cogency and the urgency of Irigaray’s critique of the dominant modes 
of eliding sexual difference in contemporary Western culture generally, 
but in therapeutic praxis more specifically, regarding the claims of 
Spinelli’s existential phenomenology to reveal the texture of lived 
experience as inter-relational. Some of the questions worth exploring 
from the perspective of Irigaray’s post-structuralism are: At what 
points in Spinelli’s work do we find the elision of sexual difference? 
More specifically, does his work recognize the phallocentric 
structuring of “woman” within the inter-relational realm? Finally, if 
the meaning of what it means to be woman does not get represented 
on its own terms, what consequences does this have for his praxis? 
My analysis of his work through Irigaray’s notion of sexual 
difference will make explicit some of Spinelli’s implicit assumptions 
regarding the issues that encompass the inter-subjective realm of 
existential psychotherapy. A re-examined understanding will call upon 
his existential phenomenological psychology to be true to its own 
project of not forgetting to pay attention to fundamental questions; of 
not forgetting the inter-subjective nature of the lebenswelt, and of not 
forgetting to question its own cultural assumptions regarding inter-
subjectivity vis-à-vis sexual difference.  
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1.9 Possible benefits of incorporating sexual difference in 
Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy  
Critiquing Spinelli’s existential phenomenological therapy from 
the perspective of sexual difference will benefit practitioners of 
existential phenomenological psychotherapy. For instance, paying 
careful attention to the motif of sexual difference in the lived 
experiences of human subjects and situating the same within the 
inter-relational realm will help revitalize and open the space for a 
genuine dialogue between two subjects instead of a monologue. An 
example from my professional practice will help illustrate this point. A 
couple of years ago, I worked with a female patient in her mid-fifties 
whose presenting concerns involved a desire to reestablish her “voice” 
in the context of her relationships with her husband and her mother. 
During the course of therapy, I recognized that having/not having a 
voice – her concern to “be heard” was inextricably linked to her 
identity as a woman. Identity is, in turn linked to the cultural 
imaginary. To her, I was a representative of an “other” who was 
supposedly different and understanding compared to the others in her 
life at that time. Looking back, I can state that my 
intervention/interpretation of what was happening in the moment 
made a shift in the inter-relational realm. That moment can be 
marked as crucial in our interaction, as my client was able to enter 
into a dialogue and also make her voice heard in her terms.  
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Recognizing and acknowledging sexual difference would mean 
that the existential phenomenological practitioner needs to utilize 
skills that would help him/her navigate challenges that a female 
patient struggles with as she tries to redefine herself. In a general 
sense, the practitioner would benefit if he/she positions him-herself 
as a participant and not as an outside observer, use interventions that 
are about the here and now (between the therapist and the client), is 
willing to take risks on behalf of sexual difference, and invent spaces 
that would allow women to assume and own their sexed ‘I’ position. 
By being alert to the struggles emerging from the awareness of sexual 
difference, existential psychotherapy will continue to deal with “the 
world” in all its dimensions without evicting it out of the consulting 
room. Above all, an engagement with “sexual difference” will force 
Spinelli’s existential phenomenological psychology to challenge its own 
assumptions regarding the normative assumptions of female 
sexuality.  
In this dissertation, I will articulate the place of sexual 
difference in Spinelli's existential phenomenological psychology. In so 
doing, I will apply the deconstructive psychoanalytic techniques 
utilized by Irigaray in her analyses of the "blind spots" of various 
psychoanalytic and philosophical positions toward understanding how 
Spinelli's approach to the inter-subjective landscape of psychotherapy 
is influenced by certain implicit and explicit assumptions concerning 
sexual difference. Specifically, I will examine how he takes up the 
body as it manifests in therapy, and how this either allows for or 
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disavows the presence of the both the client and therapist as sexually-
specific “others.” This will require a close attention to the constructs 
he deploys in his theoretical accounts of, and justifications for, 
elements of his practice that address embodiment and sexual 
difference. Through this analysis, I hope to show that by paying 
attention to sexual difference, existential psychotherapy can benefit 
from being attuned to creative possibilities that emerge as the 
therapist listens to the body speaking (both one's own and the 
client's) with a different ear. I also want to show that when the 
therapist can move beyond the constrictions of a phallocentric 
discourse, sexual difference as a non-phallic relation to language and 
body will structure inter-subjectivity. 
In the next chapter, I will first explicate the notion of the 
imaginary within the psychoanalytic tradition to contextualize 
Irigaray’s own understanding of the imaginary. My outline will provide 
us an understanding of Irigaray’s own notion of the imaginary and 
how it impacts her work in creating the conditions of possibility for 
women to take up the position of an “I” within the socio-cultural 
order.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
The imaginary and sexual difference 
 
The coherence of a conceptual system does not 
imply its truth, but may be the coherence of its 
phantasy. 
           - Margaret Whitford, 
Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, p. 69 
 
The theory of the human body is always a part 
of a world-picture….The theory of the human 
body is always a part of a fantasy.  
                          - James Hillman, The Myth of Analysis, p. 220 
 
2.1 The imaginary within the psychoanalytic tradition 
Irigaray’s (1985a; 1985b) critique of the Western cultural 
imaginary is primarily based on her deconstruction of the notion of 
the imaginary as developed within the psychoanalytic tradition of 
Jacques Lacan (1977). Within these traditions, the imaginary is 
primarily (though not exclusively) associated with the formation of the 
ego. Freud’s understanding of the ego’s formation evolved from his 
attempts to reconcile a biological and a psychological approach to 
understanding psychic life. Grosz (1994, pp. 27-39) identifies two 
understandings of the ego that Freud proposes in his study of 
perception, one from The Ego and the Id (1923/1961) and the other 
from On Narcissism (1914/1957). Briefly stated, the “realist model” of 
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ego formation consists of seeing the ego as a pre-determined entity, a 
mediating principle between pleasure and the demands of reality. 
Freud (1923/1961) compares the ego to that of a man on horse back: 
In its relation to the id, the ego is like a man on 
horse back, who has to hold in check the superior 
strength of the horse; with this difference, that the 
rider tries to do so with his own strength while the 
ego uses borrowed forces. (p. 25) 
 
The main function, then, of the “realist ego” is to mediate, to keep in 
check the forces of pleasure versus the demands of a repressive 
reality. Alternatively, the “narcissistic model” sees the ego as self-
image constructed through a dynamic process of internalization of 
images, both of one’s own body and that of others’. In this view, the 
ego is inter-subjective, in as much as it relies on the subject’s 
relations with others.  
Jacques Lacan founds his understanding of the imaginary on 
Freud’s narcissistic model of the ego. According to Grosz, Lacan 
understands the ego to be “an imaginary outline or projection of the 
body, the body insofar as it is imagined and represented for the 
subject by the image of others (including its own reflection in the 
mirror)” (Grosz, 1994, p. 39). Lacan identifies the mirror stage as the 
moment when ego formation takes place, although he clarifies that 
this moment is not the decisive and final one. In a paper delivered at 
the International Congress of Psychoanalysis in 1949, Lacan 
elaborates on the role of the mirror stage in the formation of the 
subject. He describes the phenomenon of the reflected image in the 
mirror and the significance of the same in the formation of its ego: 
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This jubilant assumption of his specular image by 
the child at the infans stage, still sunk in his motor 
incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to 
exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic 
matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial 
form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of 
identification with the other, and before language 
restores to it, in the universal, its function as 
subject. (Lacan, 1977, p. 2) 
 
According to Lacan, the child experiences jubilation, a feeling of 
elation at the moment it recognizes its image in the mirror. This 
pleasure stems from the fact that it discovers an “I”, a sense of 
coherence of itself that is separate from others. In other words, the 
child sees itself as a unity, a whole, in contrast to its experience of its 
body as fragmentary and uncoordinated. 
At the same time, the child also experiences a feeling of 
ambivalence towards the image it sees in the mirror. The child 
experiences frustration because the image it sees is beyond it, an ideal 
to be attained. It is an ideal because it is always also the other, out of 
reach, unknown; yet to be attained. In other words, the reflected 
image in the mirror produces a sense of an “I” and “not-I” at the same 
time. In dealing with the ambivalence, the child will begin to 
internalize the mirror image instead of rejecting it. Internalization 
takes place because the image promises mastery, control over the 
body, and it holds the lure of the desire of the other; however, this 
internalization comes with a price – dissonance. The image identified 
with is different from its actual lived experience. Grosz (1990) explains 
how this dissonance organizes the infant’s psyche: 
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The image is always the image of another. Yet the 
otherness of the other is not entirely alien. The 
subject, to be a subject at all, internalizes otherness 
as its condition of possibility. It is thus radically 
split, unconscious of the processes of its own 
production, divided by lack and rupture. The ego 
illusorily sees itself as autonomous and self-
determined, independent of otherness. (p. 43)   
 
In other words, as Lacan observes, the dissonance produced in this 
dynamic between the child and his image will coagulate into a desire 
for being or having what the other desires. In his own words, “This 
form will crystallize in the subject’s internal conflictual tension, which 
determines the awakening of his desire for the object of the other’s 
desire” (1977, p. 19). Hence, the pursuit of the object of the other’s 
desire will continue to structure and constitute the subject’s identity, 
and bring with it fantasies of aggression and control.   
The jubilant recognition of seeing the unified body in the mirror 
indicates that ego formation cannot be thought of without the body. 
Thus, Grosz (1990) observes that for Lacan, the ego is not only “a 
product of the internalization of otherness,” but also “a psychical 
projection of the body, a kind of map of the body’s psycho-social 
meaning” (p. 43). Here, the word “body” refers to the lived 
understanding of one’s anatomy (which can operate at an 
unconscious, preconscious, or a conscious level), and is itself 
psychically mapped or structured along the lines of one’s parental or 
familial significations and cultural fantasies of the body’s 
organization. Thus the ego can be understood as an internalized map 
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constructed with the materials derived from one’s relations to others 
and to culture as well as the lived understanding of one’s body.     
In summary, the psychoanalytic tradition posits that the ego is 
formed on the basis of the child’s recognition of its own specular 
image reflected in the mirror and by others. Consequently, the mirror 
stage initiates a dyadic structure of imaginary identifications that is 
dependent on images and representations. For example, when the 
child sees itself in a mirror, the parent might say, “You look just like 
your father,” or “You have grandpa’s eyes,” statements that provide 
images for the child to identify with. The ego can be seen as the 
sedimentation of images of others. This means that a subject’s claim 
to knowledge is infiltrated by a function of the ego’s investment in 
sustaining (through identification) certain images that please it and 
rejecting those that are unacceptable. For instance, we see evidence of 
this in the use of the terms that evoke images like swallowing and/or 
incorporating that something is thought to be true or acceptable and 
spitting and/or expelling as something that is thought to be false or 
deemed unacceptable. For example, in the case of a person who either 
feels like throwing up or literally throws up when he/she perceives 
something traumatic (like a terrible car accident), we can say that this 
person is experiencing a kind of inability to incorporate something 
traumatic and so is expelling that which is unacceptable.  
Grosz (1990) characterizes the ego as a dynamic relation 
between the subject and others.  She maintains, “The ego can thus be 
seen as an intrasubjective relation founded on inter-subjectivity. It is 
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the coagulation and residue of internalized images of others” (1990, p. 
46). The imaginary is the domain whereby relations between self and 
others as unconscious fantasy exist in an unmediated fashion. What 
is initiated in the imaginary becomes solidified as the child enters the 
symbolic order. Entry into language is evidenced in the ability to say 
“I”, to take up a proper name, which in turn, binds together the 
imaginary identifications and helps towards forming a cohesive social 
identity. Within the Lacanian tradition, the coveted object in the 
symbolic order is the Phallus, the master signifier. To have a social 
existence, one must have a relationship to the Phallus. In the next 
section I will discuss Irigaray’s critique of the assumptions that 
construct the psychoanalytic imaginary. My interpretations in the 
following section are influenced by Elizabeth Grosz and Margaret 
Whitford’s readings of Irigaray. 
 
2.2 Irigaray’s critique of the psychoanalytic imaginary  
Luce Irigaray shows much interest in the notion of the 
imaginary and its relevance for understanding subjectivity and sexual 
difference. My interpretation of Irigaray’s critique of the imaginary 
within the psychoanalytic tradition is influenced by the interpretations 
of Margaret Whitford and Elizabeth Grosz. In Luce Irigaray: Philosophy 
in the Feminine Margaret Whitford (1991) traces the development of 
the imaginary in Irigaray’s work. She claims that while Irigaray draws 
on various sources in developing her own understanding of the 
imaginary, the psychoanalytic tradition in which she was schooled 
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remains the central source. Far from being uncritical of that tradition, 
however, Irigaray’s account deconstructs the Freudian and Lacanian 
notion of the imaginary vis-à-vis her articulation of the role of sexual 
difference in the ego’s domination. 
Whitford (1991) observes that although Irigaray does not 
discuss Lacan’s re-conceptualization of the Freudian understanding of 
the ego as self-image directly, she does acknowledge Lacan’s blind 
spot in his discussion of ego formation and the imaginary. To begin 
with, Irigaray questions the assumptions about the physical 
properties of the mirror that are implicit in Freud’s and Lacan’s 
account. More specifically, Whitford echoes Irigaray when she states 
that the flat mirror that reflects the specular image “does not reflect 
the sexual organs and the sexual specificity of the woman” (Whitford, 
1991, p. 65). Irigaray suggests instead a different sort of mirror (the 
speculum) that allows for “representation” of a woman’s morphology. 
When Irigaray refers to a woman’s morphology, she is not referring to 
a genetically coded female body or even the female anatomy, but to 
the body as a product of “social inscriptions, always inherently social” 
(Grosz, 1989, p. 112). Whitford explains Irigaray’s thinking when she 
states, “The body which is reflected in this flat mirror, and thus the 
imaginary body subtending subjectivity, is either a male body (with 
male sexual organs) or else a defective male body (a male body without 
sexual organs, hence castrated)” (1991, p. 65). Irigaray also suggests 
that women as “components of the mirror” (1985b, p. 151) support the 
male edifice in an invisible manner by being situated as the “silvering 
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at the back of the mirror” (1985a, p.197) and thus always been taken 
for granted.  
Within the psychoanalytic tradition, then, a woman is 
predestined to be without an imaginary specific to her sex. Hence the 
psychoanalytic imaginary is revealed as “masculine,” as specific to the 
morphology of the male. To put this differently, the imaginary that 
subtends subjectivity is built on the idea that the grid through which 
the girl comes to make sense of the whole world is modeled on the 
boy’s experience of seeing the world. In this model, her difference and 
sexual specificity is overlooked and subsumed under the male grid. 
For example, in cultures where men have the tendency to sexually 
objectify women, heterosexual women invariably internalize this 
masculine perception of physical appearance and work towards 
“shaping” their physical appearance to fit the masculine perceptional 
grid of what is desirous and acceptable.  
The implication of a mono-sexual model for the little girl is, in 
Irigaray’s words, “[T]he little man that the little girl is, must become a 
man minus certain attributes whose paradigm is morphological – 
attributes capable of determining, of assuring, the reproduction-
specularization of the same” (1985a, p. 27). Thus women in this 
mono-sexual discourse are perceived as defective males and their role 
is to safeguard sameness. For example, as Irigaray observes that in 
case of marriage, a woman is “forced to renounce the marks of her 
ancestry and inscribe herself on man’s pedigree. She leaves her 
family, her ‘house,’ her name – though admittedly it too is only a 
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patronymic – her family tree, in favor of her husband’s” (1985a, p. 33). 
She is an object that is exchanged between men (father to husband) in 
order to safeguard sameness.   
Whitford (1991, p.65) characterizes Irigaray’s critique of both 
Freud and Lacan as “psychoanalyzing the psychoanalysts.” Irigaray 
does this when she analyzes the analyst’s imaginary, the unconscious 
fantasies that subtend the logic of psychoanalytic rationality. Yet, 
Freud and Lacan are not the only ones whose imaginary is male; 
rather, their conceptualizations reflect their participation in the 
phallocentric cultural symbolic while also reinforcing it.  
By critiquing the imaginary, Whitford cautions that Irigaray is 
not trying to prescribe what the female should be. Instead, she 
challenges the presumption that the Western imaginary is a given, 
and therefore something that is immutable and true. Instead, 
Whitford shows that for Irigaray “what is taken to be the unalterable 
order of reality (discursive or otherwise) is in fact imaginary and 
therefore susceptible to change” (1991, p. 67). For instance, Irigaray 
wonders what it would be like if a woman’s desires were not governed 
by the male imaginary:  
If woman had desires other than ‘penis-envy,’ this 
would call into question the unity, the uniqueness, 
the simplicity of the mirror charged with sending 
man’s image back to him – albeit inverted. Call into 
question its flatness. The specularization, and 
speculation, of the purpose of (his) desire could no 
longer be two-dimensional. (1985a, p. 51) 
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Irigaray (1985b) also cautions that we cannot leap out of the 
economy of the male imaginary or the cultural symbolic to elucidate a 
“new theory of women.” Instead she proposes a different strategy:  
[T]he issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of 
which woman would be the subject or the object, 
but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself, of 
suspending its pretension to the production of a 
truth and of a meaning that are excessively 
univocal. Which presupposes that women do not 
aspire simply to be men’s equals in knowledge. That 
they do not claim to be rivaling men in constructing 
a logic of the feminine that would still take onto-
theo-logic as its model …. They should not put it, 
then, in the form ‘What is woman?’ but rather, 
repeating/interpreting the way in which, within 
discourse, the feminine finds itself defined as lack, 
deficiency, or as imitation and negative image of the 
subject, they should signify that with respect to this 
logic a disruptive excess is possible on the feminine 
side. (1985b, p. 78) 
 
So, she cautions against answering questions concerning 
“womanhood” as a static and essential category or an unchanging 
material referent, as she understands such questions to emerge from 
the very discourse that ignores the difference of “her” sex. Any 
transformation of theory, practice, on the material reality of men’s and 
women’s lives requires a fundamental shift at the level of the 
imaginary.   
Irigaray suggests that “re-imagining” the imaginary will require 
a new strategy for listening to the unconscious in/of philosophy: 
We need to listen (psycho)analytically to its 
procedures of repression, to the structuration of 
language that shores up its representations, 
separating the true from the false, the meaningful 
from the meaningless, and so forth…. What is called 
for instead is an examination of the operation of the 
‘grammar’ of each figure of discourse, its syntactic 
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laws or requirements, its imaginary configurations, 
its metaphoric networks, and also of course, what it 
does not articulate at the level of utterance: its 
silences. (1985b, p. 75) 
 
Thus for Irigaray, it is not about prescribing what the female should 
be, but describing how it functions within the western imaginary and 
symbolic operations, in order to show how what is taken to be the 
unalterable order of reality (discursive or otherwise) is in fact 
imaginary and therefore susceptible to change.   
 
2.3 Phenomenologists’ and Irigaray’s understanding of the 
imaginary  
Margaret Whitford (1991) observes that both Irigaray and the 
phenomenologists (like Merleau-Ponty and Sartre) share an 
understanding of the imaginary as structuring experiences. Irigaray 
states in her An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993a), that like Merleau-
Ponty (1968), she is also interested in the “pre-discursive experience.” 
For Merleau-Ponty, the pre-discursive experience is that which 
informs our rationality and judgments. By returning to this moment, 
Merleau-Ponty hoped to create a different language, a language of 
alterity. For Merleau-Ponty, however, this pre-discursive experience is 
always already historical. In other words, it precedes our very 
existence. This claim on the part of Merleau-Ponty raises suspicions in 
Irigaray. According to her, he fails to see how a different language can 
be created if the pre-discursive is always already implicated in the 
symbolic.   
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As stated earlier, Irigaray’s notion of the imaginary goes beyond 
that of the phenomenologists, when she conceptualizes the imaginary 
in terms of the morphological marks of bodies. For instance, the body 
gets mapped into zones (erogenous and otherwise) as in the case of an 
infant that is fed, thus mapping his/her mouth (instead of the ear or 
the nose, for instance) as a zone of pleasure and satiation; or when 
the child “learns” that he/she uses hands to touch things (and not the 
mouth for instance), thus mapping the hand as a zone for 
experiencing tactile sensations, etc. To Irigaray, the phenomenologists 
fail to take into account the sexual other, “an other whose body’s 
ontological status would differ from my own” (Irigaray, 1993a, p.157).  
Irigaray’s critical reading of the psychoanalytic tradition extends 
to the Western metaphysical tradition. Her critique reveals that the 
imaginary that underlies the Western metaphysical tradition is based 
on an exclusionary model – the male gets represented on his own 
terms in the cultural imaginary and the female gets subsumed and 
functions according to male parameters. However, Irigaray also 
recognizes the importance of being phenomenological in her 
methodology. To this effect, Irigaray asserts, “A certain recourse, or 
return to the phenomenological method seems necessary in order to 
make enter into the universe of the rational some natural, corporeal, 
sensible realities which until now had been removed from it” (Irigaray, 
2000, p. 156). A phenomenological method/description would reveal 
that the natural, corporeal and sensible permeate and suffuse all 
knowledge. The Cartesian subject, on the contrary, would try to purify 
 37
all knowledge of the products of imagination to arrive at clear and 
distinct knowledge. In this context, as Whitford points out, Irigaray 
believes the “disjunction from the imaginary cannot finally be made, 
that knowledge always bears the mark of the imaginary, and that 
what we take to be universal and objective is in fact male” (Whitford, 
1991, p. 56). The next section will show how Irigaray’s strategy of 
using the elemental provides her a language by which she destabilizes 
the conceptual edifice of Western thought by inviting us to pay 
attention to what is covered over in our everyday life.   
Irigaray (1993c) identifies four basic elements as primitive 
categories used by the imagining mind: earth, fire, water and air:  
These elements, which, since the beginning of 
philosophy, have been a focus of meditation of every 
creation of a world, have often been misunderstood 
in our culture, which has tended to refuse to think 
about the material conditions of existence.…Our so-
called human sciences and our day-to-day speech 
steer clear of the elements, moving through and 
with a language that forgets the matter it names 
and by means of which it speaks. (pp. 57-58) 
 
Irigaray posits these four elements in turn as being subtended by a 
more basic schema, viz., the male/female division. Her choice of the 
four elements provides her a vocabulary (construction materials) to 
counter the conceptual edifice of Western metaphysics of being. 
Whitford writes: 
In the first place, it provides a vocabulary for 
talking in the most basic terms about the material 
of passional life, about opposition and conflict, or 
love and exchange, about fertility and creativity, of 
sterility and death, a vocabulary which is more 
immediate and direct in its language than the 
abstractions of conceptualization, yet without the 
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immobilizing tendencies of the concept. It is a 
discursive strategy which allows for fluidity. (1991, 
p. 61)  
 
Whitford suggests other related reasons for Irigaray to utilize the 
elemental vocabulary when speaking about the female body and its 
morphology, and when speaking of the erotic. Elemental, materially-
focused language allows for a displacement of the visual and/or the 
gaze, for example, and allows for a speech “in terms of space and 
thresholds and fluids, fire and water, air and earth, without 
objectifying, hypostatizing, or essentializing” (Whitford, 1991, p. 62). 
The elemental, hence can “represent” “an unstructured and fluid 
psychic space, less constrained by the dominant imaginary, more 
open to other possibilities” (Whitford, 1991, p. 62). The next section 
examines the possibility opened up by the elemental vocabulary in 
symbolizing feminine subjectivity.  
 
2.4 The condition of possibility for a female imaginary and 
symbolic  
If the Western metaphysical tradition is subtended by a male 
imaginary, then it is crucial to ask: how to bring about a change in the 
imaginary? Whitford problematizes this issue when she points out 
that a change in the imaginary is nearly impossible if the social 
institutions “continue to support the phantasies of the male 
imaginary” (1991, p. 91). In an incisive and challenging essay, Women 
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on the Market, Irigaray (1985b) utilizes a Marxian analysis of 
commodities to analyze the role of women as objects. She explains:   
Mother, virgin, prostitute: these are the social roles 
imposed on women. The characteristics of (so-called) 
feminine sexuality derive from them: the 
valorization of reproduction and nursing; 
faithfulness; modesty, ignorance of and even lack of 
interest in sexual pleasure; a passive acceptance of 
men’s ‘activity’; seductiveness, in order to arouse 
the consumers’ desire while offering herself as its 
material support without getting pleasure herself … 
Neither as mother nor as virgin nor as prostitute has 
woman any right to her own pleasure. (p. 186) 
 
Her analysis of the social roles imposed upon women characterizes 
feminine sexuality as objects/material support for enactment of male 
fantasies. Ignoring such a characterization of feminine sexuality is 
tantamount to perpetuating the status quo.  
Whitford also points out that the imaginary cannot be changed 
without the symbolic changing also. She clarifies, “The imaginary is 
an effect of the symbolic; it is the symbolic which structures the 
imaginary, so that there is a sense in which the imaginary does not 
exist until it is symbolized” (1991, p. 91). Also, the symbolic, 
understood as structure (or a position of enunciation) would be empty 
without the contents of the imaginary. Irigaray proposes that 
symbolizing the mother-daughter relationship as an archetype for 
women’s relations among each other and establishing this externally 
in the social register would create a pause in the male imaginary. 
Whitford argues that such attempts at symbolic representation “would 
constitute an external reality which might block the more damaging 
effects of the male imaginary and ideally have a creative outcome” 
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(1991, p. 92).  This symbolization is not to replace the paternal with 
the maternal but would allow the woman as subject to enter into the 
symbolic for the first time. 
In the next chapter I examine some of the obstacles that stand 
in the way of symbolizing woman as subject. I also show how Irigaray 
attempts at a positive articulation of female subjectivity vis-à-vis the 
conceptual edifice of Western metaphysics.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Sexual difference and woman as subject 
 
There is no simple manageable way to leap to 
the outside of phallogocentrism, nor any 
possible way to situate oneself there, that would 
result from the simple fact of being a woman.   
- Luce Irigaray, This sex which is not one, p.162 
 
Can we think women as other without 
systematizing otherness, without construing it 
in terms of the totalizing discourse that defines 
woman as other? 
  - Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros, p. 176-7  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Among the many postmodern thinkers who have influenced 
Luce Irigaray’s articulation of a female symbolic and sexual difference, 
Jacques Derrida’s work is perhaps one of the most important. In 
particular, Irigaray is indebted to his deconstructive style of reading 
Western metaphysical thought as structured around hierarchal 
binaries. A deconstructive reading calls into question the foundations 
of Western metaphysics and its economy of “phallogocentrism,” that 
is, the operative principle of culture as grounded in values associated 
with Western traditional masculinity (a masculinity associated with 
among other things, class privilege, “whiteness”, and Judeo-Christian 
religious values). For instance, in his work, Speech and Phenomena 
 42
(1973), Derrida critiques the concept of presence in Edmund Husserl’s 
privileging of the “masculine” properties of speech over writing (the 
unprivileged term). Writing is unprivileged because in relation to 
speech, as Derrida notes, the speaker is absent in writing and thus by 
implication removed from the immediacy of and control over meaning. 
Thus we could say writing as absence/lack can be associated with 
“feminine” properties. Derrida remarks that when speech/voice is 
suspended, its status also changes to being unstable and ambiguous. 
In his own words, “A voice without différance, a voice without writing, 
is at once absolutely alive and absolutely dead” (Derrida, 1973, p. 102, 
emphasis in original). By destabilizing this bias towards speech as 
meaning/presence in Western metaphysics, Derrida deconstructs the 
notion of identity as the locus from which meaning as presence 
emerges. Derrida renders self-presence as “de-centered”, unstable, in 
flux. Derrida and Irigaray however, have different intentions in 
questioning and deconstructing the pervasive hierarchical 
assumptions of Western metaphysics. While Derrida aims towards 
deconstructing phallogocentrism and problematizing any clear-cut 
dividing line between two positions, Irigaray is concerned with the 
complexity of how to represent the feminine subject in a context where 
representation itself is fraught with problems. In this sense, any 
insistence on the part of feminists for representation can learn much 
from deconstruction (Grosz, 1995, p. 116). 
In this chapter then, I will show how unlike Derrida, Luce 
Irigaray offers a positive articulation of feminine subjectivity that 
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avoids essentializing sexual difference and gender. Derrida claims that 
his primary concern is with the deconstruction of conceptual 
frameworks and not with the construction of new concepts. In this 
context, Derrida’s neologisms like différance, supplement, pharmakon, 
and so on, are not concepts per se, but provisional terms coined by 
him to offset and put into play rigid, hierarchical binary structures. In 
the process of rendering her articulation of feminine subjectivity, I will 
also show how Irigaray presents a systematic and detailed rethinking 
of the conditions that would make it possible for women to coexist and 
dialogue with men on their own terms. Lastly, I will also illustrate the 
conditions (as articulated by Irigaray) with which sexually different 
subjects can engage in communication without subsuming or 
incorporating each other. As two subjects they remain irreducible to 
each other and return to themselves without losing their 
subjectivities.   
 
3.2 Sexual difference and deconstruction 
In this section, I explore how Irigaray utilizes deconstruction in 
relation to the task of dealing with the problematic of sexual 
difference. Irigaray’s method consists of psychoanalyzing Western 
metaphysical discourse and practices in order to bring to the fore the 
unconscious, what is repressed. To this end, she adopts Derrida’s 
style, namely, deconstruction. More specifically, she adopts 
deconstruction’s tactic of de-centering/subverting the central or 
privileged term within a binary structure by undercutting its illusory 
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independence from the marginalized term. Like Derrida, she does not 
attempt to efface Western metaphysical discourse, or to wipe it off the 
map, so to speak. As Barbara Johnson, a translator of Derrida’s La 
Dissémination, explains, “Deconstruction is not synonymous with 
destruction, however. It is in fact much closer to the original meaning 
of the word analysis, which etymologically means “to undo” – a virtual 
synonym for ‘to deconstruct’” (1980, p. 5). For instance, with the 
binary pair man-woman, deconstruction subverts and de-centers the 
privileged term, “man” by showing that the term “man” is dependent 
on the term “woman” for meaning; adopting the language of biology 
(and science fiction), we could describe these terms as “symbionts.” 
The marginalized term “woman” would now take on the central 
position for a temporary period and thus disrupt the ossified dynamic 
of the binary. The intention is to set up a free play that would loosen 
the tendency within the binary structure to fix, centralize and totalize. 
In this sense, deconstruction is not an attack from the outside, but 
like a parasite works from the inside. In Derrida’s words: 
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy 
structures from the outside. They are not possible 
and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, 
except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting 
them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, 
and all the more when one does not suspect it. 
Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all 
the strategic and economic resources of subversion 
from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, 
that is to say without being able to isolate their  
elements and atoms, the enterprise of 
deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to 
its own work. (1998, p. 24) 
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With the use of the phrase, “in a certain way” Derrida reminds us of 
the impossibility of stepping out of the metaphysical economy. Irigaray 
however, can be understood as inhabiting the structure in a certain 
(“other”) way because she speaks as a woman. Speaking as a woman 
means to speak “from a non-existent place, which has to be created or 
invented as she goes along, and at the same time to show that 
philosophers have a locatable, sexual place of enunciation” (Whitford, 
1991, p. 124). 
Irigaray adopts a deconstructive style specifically when dealing 
with the problematic of sexual difference. She believes that to effect a 
change in the symbolic order we cannot simply swap terms around or 
make a simple reversal of claims regarding woman. Instead, Irigaray 
purposefully adopts the strategy of mimesis in order to deconstruct 
the phallocentric representations of women; however, she claims that 
mimicry is only a preliminary phase at thinking through sexual 
difference. Her mimetic strategy parallels Derrida’s deconstructive 
strategy of “inhabiting (the structures) in a certain (other) way.” 
Regarding her strategy of mimesis, she writes:  
There is, in an initial phase, perhaps only one 
‘path,’ the one historically assigned to the feminine: 
that of mimicry. One must assume the feminine role 
deliberately.  Which means already to convert a 
form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus 
to begin to thwart it …. To play with mimesis is 
thus, for a woman, to try to recover the place of her 
exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself 
to be simply reduced to it ... so as to make ‘visible,’ 
by an effect of playful repetition what was supposed 
to remain invisible: the cover-up of a possible 
operation of the feminine in language. (1985b, p. 
76) 
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Additionally, she claims that her strategy of mimicry is of the sort 
“historically assigned to the feminine.” Here, she cites Plato, who 
distinguishes two kinds of mimesis: “mimesis as production, which 
would lie more in the realm of music, and … mimesis that would be 
already caught up in a process of imitation, specularization, 
adequation, and reproduction” (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 131). Irigaray 
identifies her strategy of mimesis as the latter. Through this strategy 
she seeks to deconstruct the feminine requirements of patriarchy. 
Margaret Whitford (1991) clarifies the possible reasons for Irigaray’s 
use of this strategy. For Irigaray, she observes, any attempt at 
representation of women or even their non-representation falls within 
the domain of the phallocentric system. Mimesis, as an “initial phase,” 
is tactical in as much as through “playful repetition” Irigaray would 
make visible what was supposed to be invisible regarding women. 
Irigaray’s mimetic strategy is similar to what the noted psychoanalyst 
Joan Riviere refers to in her essay, “Womanliness as masquerade,” 
written in 1929. She writes, “Womanliness, therefore, [can] be 
assumed and worn as a mask, both to hide the possession of 
masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if [a woman] was found 
to possess it – much as a thief will turn out his pockets and ask to be 
searched to prove that he has not stolen the goods” (as cited in 
Burgin, Donald, & Kaplan, 1986, p. 37-8). This feminine masquerade 
allows a woman who violates social codes of her time by participating 
in a “highly” intellectual profession, for example, to project an outward 
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expression of extreme femininity in her appearance and behavior in 
order to diffuse and allay male fears of the woman “doing a man’s job” 
in a man’s world. From the place of cultural support for their role in 
mimetic praxis, women as artful mimes can use this strategy toward 
protecting themselves from being re-introjected into the masculine 
fabric of thought.   
Although Derrida recognizes the work of phallogocentric logic in 
metaphysical structures, he seems to shy away from pursuing 
deconstruction beyond this point. He considers the work of 
deconstruction irrelevant after the opposition has been deconstructed. 
In fact, after this point, Derrida also appears to be skeptical and wary 
of any attempt (of philosophers like Irigaray) at thinking through the 
possibility of the radical alterity of the unprivileged term, which is the 
“female.” For him, rethinking the other (the repressed term) would 
amount to phallocratism (that is, it would reestablish the rule of 
repressed term). This would lead to a replay of oppression by the 
repressed term. In his words, “[T]he hierarchy of dual oppositions [in 
this case male and female] always reestablishes itself” (Derrida, 1981, 
p. 42). Derrida is understandably cautious about operating from 
outside of metaphysics; in other words, as Chanter observes, “[T]o 
deconstruct metaphysics by using any language other than that which 
metaphysics itself provides” (1995, p. 247) is unimaginable for 
Derrida. Irigaray, too, is well aware of the challenge posed by the trap 
of metaphysics. She is aware that it is tricky and slippery to step out 
and re-conceptualize the structure after establishing the free play 
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between the terms. Thus we can assume her agreement with Derrida 
on this point, as expressed in the following caveat: 
We do not escape, in particular, by thinking we can 
dispense with a rigorous interpretation of 
phallogocentrism.  There is no simple manageable 
way to leap to the outside of phallogocentrism, nor 
any possible way to situate oneself there, that would 
result from the simple fact of being a woman. 
(1985b, p. 162) 
 
In her essay, “Ontology and Equivocation,” Elizabeth Grosz 
(1995) is sympathetic to Derrida’s problems with feminist discourse 
vis-à-vis deconstruction. However, she also observes a “certain 
strategic ambiguity in Derrida’s use of the notion of … a sexuality, a 
sexuality before the imposition of dual sex roles, a sexuality that is 
somehow ontological but entirely without qualities and attributes” 
(1995, p. 121). Grosz clarifies her observations regarding Derrida by 
distinguishing between two meanings of the word “sexuality”. She 
states:  
It is clear that sexuality, in the sense of ‘pleasurable 
drive,’ could quite valuably be understood as a 
mode of prior indeterminacy that gains its specific 
form and qualities a posteriori, and largely as an 
effect of binary polarization. It is not so easy to see 
how sexuality, in the sense of sexed subjectivity, 
male and female, can be understood as 
indeterminate. (1995, p. 121-2) 
 
Here Grosz cautions that if we fail to acknowledge sexual difference, 
there is a danger of sexual difference collapsing to sexual neutrality. 
Thus in her critique of Derrida, Grosz affirms unequivocally that for 
her, affirming the “irreducible specificity of each sex relative to the 
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other” (1995, 121-2.) is a sine qua non and an a priori to any 
discussion of specific forms and qualities of sexuality.   
Deconstruction does seem well within its bounds as its concern 
is not about valorizing and/or rethinking woman (the unprivileged 
term), but to challenge the authority of man (the privileged term) and 
to create flexibility within the structure. Unless the conditions of 
possibility for articulating her subjectivity is not taken up, she will 
remain as the “other of the same” (that is, a poor imitation of man, or 
as a negative term, as ‘– A’, where man is represented as ‘A’ (Grosz, 
1990, p. 172). As an “other of the same,” woman continues to remain 
homeless within the symbolic order. And, I would add, the possibility 
of sexual difference – of woman as “other of the other,” as sexually 
specific subjects – will continue to have no real place in the psycho-
social imagination.   
 
3.3 Sexual division as sexual indifference 
One of the major challenges facing a feminist thinker like 
Irigaray is to articulate the conditions of existence for woman such 
that she may operate as a sexually specific subject in relation to her 
environment. To recall, according to her analysis of the psychoanalytic 
tradition, the phallus governs the symbolic order. Subjectivity is 
structured hence according to the fantasy of either “being” or “having” 
a phallus. Since women (as castrated) do not “have” a phallus, they 
are alienated in the symbolic order. Language is not able to mediate 
the loss that women suffer. This is what allows Irigaray to claim that 
 50
women are homeless within the symbolic order (Grosz, 1990; Whitford 
1991).   
In her thought-provoking essay, “Divine Women,” Irigaray 
(1993c) asserts that positing a divine ideal for women as a model of 
subjectivity would serve as a guarantee of a horizon. She asserts that 
the divine as horizon is “not a luxury but a necessity” (1993c, p. 67). It 
is a necessity because without a guideline, a horizon, women lack a 
reference for their own becoming, and can become vulnerable to the 
dictates of others. In discussing the leitmotif of “divine,” she reframes 
the function of the mirror to suit the needs of woman’s becoming. In 
Irigaray’s hands, the mirror stands not as a metaphor for alienation in 
and through the gaze of the other, but is used as a metonymic device. 
In the phallic economy of subjectivity, the mirror, which serves to 
alienate women from their own becoming, is now made by Irigaray to 
serve a positive purpose of self-contemplation. Irigaray contends:  
We look at ourselves in the mirror to please 
someone, rarely to interrogate the state of our body 
or our spirit, rarely for ourselves and in search of 
our own becoming.  The mirror almost always 
serves to reduce us to a pure exteriority – of a very 
particular kind…. The mirror signifies the 
constitution of a fabricated (female) other that I 
shall put forward as an instrument of seduction in 
my place. I seek to be seductive and to be content 
with images of which I theoretically remain the 
artisan, the artist. I have yet to unveil, unmask, or 
veil myself for me – to veil myself so as to achieve 
self-contemplation, for example, to let my gaze 
travel over myself so as to limit my exposure to the 
other and repossess my own gestures and 
garments, thus nestling back into my vision and 
contemplation of myself. (1993c, p. 65) 
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In other words, the mirror is not a weapon or a tool to alienate a 
woman from her own becoming but serves not only as a guide to 
gather her fragmented and alienated self but also to validate her in 
her autonomous subjectivity. This “self,” however, is not another 
“identity,” or a hypostatized entity but a loose assemblage, a series of 
provisional, fluid-like contact points. 
Irigaray’s analysis (1985a) of the Western metaphysical tradition 
also shows that an economy of the death drive constitutes the human 
(man and woman). This economy of the death drive is represented in 
the concept of castration anxiety, that is, the refusal of the subject to 
face loss, historically linked at least (in the history of philosophy) to 
notions of mortality and death. Death, in this context, is represented 
as a ‘hole’ or ‘nothingness’ within the phallic order. Within the male 
imaginary, women stand in close proximity to this lack/hole in 
existence. Each gender negotiates this threat of dissolution and 
nothingness in his/her own way. Man negotiates his threat by 
projecting his anxiety onto woman as she “represents death or the 
unthinkable for/by men” (Whitford, 1991, p. 115).  
To understand what facilitates this projection of his anxiety onto 
woman, I will elaborate on what Irigaray (1993c) describes as the 
“flawed distribution” of tasks and functions within the symbolic order. 
She observes, “The human race has been divided into two functions, 
two tasks, not two genders.  Under pain of death, woman has 
renounced her gender. Man has done the same, though differently” 
(1993c, p. 120). Based on this symbolic distribution, woman bears 
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functions and tasks that invalidate her genealogy and transcendence. 
For example, the function and task of childrearing that has been 
largely borne by women is so well entrenched into the cultural 
imaginary-symbolic, thanks to the “flawed distribution” whereby she 
was the bearer of the corporeal. In this symbolic division, woman is 
the possessor of the unwanted, the unknown, and nothingness. 
Whitford echoes Irigaray when she states, “An ethics of sexual 
difference, that is, an ethics which recognizes the subjectivity of each 
sex, would have to address the symbolic division which allocates the 
material, corporeal, sensible, ‘natural’ to the feminine, and the 
spiritual, ideal, intelligible, transcendental to the masculine” (1991, p. 
149). Whitford (1991) agrees with Irigaray in saying that we cannot 
have an ethics of sexual difference without addressing the symbolic 
division that remains unexamined within the symbolic and social 
realms.   
As a consequence of having to bear the “negative” aspects 
involved in reproducing the symbolic order, women achieve 
“transcendence” differently from men. By bearing the ‘negative’ aspect 
of the division, the price paid by woman is losing her place within the 
symbolic order. Thus she is “located” only in the margins, relegated to 
“lower” functions – functions associated with the body.  
Transcendence, a higher function and a prerogative of the male is 
achieved by overcoming the sensible, the lower function that is 
allocated to the female. In her essay, “Any theory of the ‘Subject’ has 
always been appropriated by the ‘Masculine’,” Irigaray (1985a) 
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captures the inevitable flight of the male who is severed/severs 
himself from the corporeal. The female on the other hand – always 
already embodied – seems to transcend by a sort of “re-tour.” She 
states:  
Rising to a perspective that would dominate the 
totality, to the vantage point of greatest power, he 
thus cuts himself off from the bedrock, from his 
empirical relationship with the matrix that he 
claims to survey. To specularize and to speculate. 
Exiling himself ever further (toward) where the 
greatest power lies, he thus becomes the ‘sun’…a 
pole of attraction stronger than the ‘earth.’ 
Meanwhile, the excess in this universal fascination 
is that ‘she’ also turns upon herself, that she knows 
how to re-turn (upon herself) but not how to seek 
outside for identity within the other: nature, sun, 
God…(woman). As things now go, man moves away 
in order to preserve his stake in the value of his 
representation, while woman counterbalances with 
the permanence of a (self)recollection which is 
unaware of itself as such. (1985a, 133-4)   
 
Thus, according to Irigaray, men and women achieve transcendence 
very differently. Within the operations of a phallic economy, Irigaray 
points out that the woman acts as a mirror and a base/earth. Man 
presses down/re-presses the woman to enable him to launch off, to 
take flight, to achieve transcendence. Irigaray describes woman’s effort 
at transcendence as a “re-turn upon herself.” I will revisit this image 
of woman re-turning to herself in this chapter, in the context of 
discussing Irigaray’s notion of the two lips. For now, it suffices to say 
that for women, the price paid by them for being used as the launch 
pad from which man projects himself into an “identity” is that access 
to transcendence is denied to her and (as Whitford observes), “she 
must always be for-men, available for their transcendence” (1991, p. 
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153). Ironically, this configuration of sexual difference can be as 
harmful for men as it is for women. Whitford suggests, “Man may 
think he is active, dynamic, propelling himself upwards from earth to 
sky, but he is in a sepulchre, while woman, like Antigone, is 
imprisoned and buried alive” (1991, p. 157). 
Within this phallic economy, death, experienced as annihilation, 
dissolution, and nothingness is also relegated to the woman. Simply 
put, man negotiates his own otherness (negative) by projecting it onto 
his “other half” (woman) to hold or contain his otherness for him. In 
this way, the phallic economy of sexual relations perpetuates the 
forgetting of the problematic of sexual difference. In this context, 
Irigaray proposes a redistribution of functions and tasks that 
acknowledges sexual difference. In other words, Irigaray believes that 
a symbolic redistribution would necessitate that man appropriate his 
otherness, and that woman have access to transcendence in her own 
terms. This also means that man seeking transcendence will have to 
seek a different “g[r]o[un]d” that takes into account his own body. In 
other words, his divine needs to change; this would allow him to 
appropriate his own body, his otherness. If woman ceases to be the 
ground from which he would ascend, then he would have to 
renegotiate the terms and conditions of his own transcendence. Just 
as man needs to renegotiate his ‘movements’ within the symbolic 
order, woman as subject will have to find navigational strategies that 
are in consonance with her female subjectivity. In the next section, I 
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will explain how woman as ‘other of the other’ can/could renegotiate 
her path to transcendence.   
 
3.4 The sensible transcendental as horizon 
If woman is to be realized as an ‘other of the other’ then she 
should also have an ideal that is specific to her own ontological status. 
In this context, Irigaray’s proposition that women have their own “god” 
makes more sense. Irigaray’s purpose in introducing the divine in 
relation to sexual difference purports a dual function: 1) “of providing 
a non-restrictive horizon for identity,” (Whitford, 1991, p. 141) and 2) 
“binding the violence of the social body” (Whitford, 1991, p. 141). In 
what follows, I will explain how the two functions are in consonance 
with sexual difference.   
Following the nineteenth-century German philosopher Ludwig 
Feuerbach’s arguments for mankind’s need for a God, Irigaray 
proposes a need for women to be linked to a divine horizon or a 
transcendent dimension. As stated earlier, she argues that women are 
excluded from the transcendental realm because of how they are 
positioned within the symbolic. Man, by appropriating transcendental 
functions and relegating sensible and corporeal functions to woman 
perpetuate this symbolic distribution of functions and tasks. To deal 
with the correlative disjunction or internal split that women 
experience within themselves, Irigaray introduces a third term – the 
sensible transcendental.   
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The sensible transcendental as a divine dimension recognizes 
the need for “[a] body … symbolized in such a way that women are no 
longer sole guardians of the corporeal, so that men can incorporate 
their own corporeality into their sublimations, so that women can 
sublimate as women” (Whitford, 1991, p. 142). The sensible 
transcendental, would force us, for instance, to reconsider the 
traditional division of labor in reproduction and childrearing normally 
validated by the construction of sexual opposition. The corporeal 
comes into play here as women take on chores like cooking, cleaning, 
doing dishes, etc.; tasks that get reinforced by statements made by 
men like, “They (mothers) are better at those things than we are.” A 
more egalitarian and/or reciprocal sharing of this labor would be one 
possible avenue for man and woman to come to terms with their 
corporeal otherness based on the acknowledgement of sexual 
difference. The sensible transcendental as a third term that would help 
bring these oppositions into play, both at the imaginary and the 
symbolic realms, such that “each sex will be able to assume its own 
divisions, its own negativity, and its own death” (Whitford, 1991, p. 
122). This divine ideal (the sensible transcendental) is also relevant as 
it would help women assert their female specificity without fear of 
being incorporated by the male version of the divine. Irigaray asserts: 
Woman has no mirror wherewith to become woman. 
Having a God and becoming one’s gender go hand 
in hand.  God is the other that we absolutely cannot 
be without. In order to become, we need some 
shadowy perception of achievement; not a fixed 
objective, not a One postulated to be immutable but 
rather a cohesion and a horizon that assures us the 
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passage between past and future, the bridge of a 
present that remembers, that is not sheer oblivion 
and loss, not a crumbling away of existence, a 
failure, simply, to take note. (1993c, p. 67)  
 
Having a God is akin to having a mirror, suggesting an alternative 
imaginary for women. This notion of “God” as mirror however, is 
different in the traditional Eurocentric/Judeo-Christian notion of God. 
The traditional notion of God is male (Father/Son/Holy Spirit) and 
stands for the possession of/and representative of an inaccessible 
transcendence. Irigaray proposes an alternative notion of “god” for 
women as the (patriarchal) theological notion of God is impoverished 
in relation to the feminine gender. She remarks: 
Our theological tradition presents some difficulty as 
far as God in the feminine gender is concerned. 
There is no woman God, no female trinity: mother, 
daughter, spirit. This paralyzes the infinite of 
becoming a woman since she is fixed in the role of 
mother through whom the son of God is made flesh. 
(Irigaray, 1993c, p. 62) 
 
Instead, she suggests: 
If she is to become woman, if she is to accomplish 
her female subjectivity, woman needs a god who is 
a figure for the perfection of her subjectivity…a 
female god who can open the perspective in which 
[her] flesh can be transfigured. (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 
64) 
 
Whitford (1991) summarizes concisely the characteristics of this 
divine dimension/horizon as postulated by Irigaray: “(1) corporeal; (2) 
sexuate, either male or female; (3) subject to becoming; (4) multiple; 
(5) incarnated in us here and now” (p. 144). Whitford predicts that 
when this corporeal image of the divine (which is non-prescriptive) is 
integrated into the current economy, there will be space created for 
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women and men to experience autonomy and responsibility. 
Undoubtedly, women will have a home in the symbolic. Along with the 
above benefits, there is a realistic possibility of an (ethical) relation 
between man and woman. In this context, Whitford observes, “It 
allows for the possibility of seeing her (Irigaray) as another woman, 
instead of as an ideal or bad mother, and therefore of relating to her 
work rather than simply swallowing it whole or rejecting it altogether” 
(1991, pp. 144-145).  
Irigaray posits that the divine dimension not only offers up an 
alternate language for subjectivity, but also serves as a paradigm for 
the regulation of violence and creating of cohesion in society 
(Whitford, 1991, pp. 144-145). To explicate this, I will follow closely 
how Irigaray utilizes the analysis and observations of the 
contemporary philosopher-anthropologist René Girard. Girard (1977) 
describes the historical role of religion in regulating violence in society 
through the ritual act of sacrifice and its underlying mechanism of 
“scapegoating.” For instance, he points out how the sacrificial 
ceremonies of the Dinkas as recorded by the ethnologist Godfrey 
Lienhardt takes place to help with regulating aggression:   
From time to time somebody detaches himself from 
the group to beat the cow or calf that has been tied 
to a nearby stake, or to hurl insults at it. There is 
nothing static or stilted about the performance; it 
succeeds in giving shape to a collective impulse that 
gradually triumphs over the forces of dispersion 
and discord by bringing corporate violence to bear 
on a ritual victim…. The ritualistic mentality 
imagines that this death will result in benefits too 
great to be ascribed to a simple punitive measure. 
(pp. 97-98)   
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Irigaray notes a parallel between Girard’s understanding of the 
mechanism of scapegoating and the Freudian phallic model of 
sexuality. She remarks that the functioning of sacrifice in the 
regulation of aggression corresponds to the “masculine model of 
sexuality described by Freud: tension, discharge, return to 
homeostasis, etc” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 76). In this context, it is also 
worth noting Whitford’s observations regarding how Irigaray 
deconstructs Girard’s failure to mention one historical sacrifice, 
common to most cultures, namely, the sacrifice associated with 
motherhood. Whitford remarks, “Relations between men and women 
are paralyzed because society does not recognize this initial sacrifice, 
does not acknowledge the debt which it owes to mothers” (1991, p. 
145). The initial and almost invisible sacrifice made by women allows 
for social productivity. This sacrifice is usually underpaid or unpaid 
female labor. Irigaray (1993c) remarks:  
No social body can be constituted, developed, or 
renewed without female labor; without the cathartic 
function of the beloved mistress or wife, the 
reproductive function of the mother, the life-giving 
and caretaking function of the housewife and nurse. 
This failure to recognize or remember establishes 
the sacrificial rite or rhythm. (p. 86)  
 
Irigaray (1993c) proposes a different model of regulating 
aggression and building cohesion at the interpersonal level. Her model 
is informed by her practice of psychoanalysis as well as by observing 
Eastern cultures. Instead of sacrifice, she suggests using words to 
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symbolize affect, being attentive to the present and being respectful of 
the rhythms of nature. In her own words: 
Thus one achieves ethical, social, and 
religious being by attending to the season, the time 
of day, the passing moment, and honoring the living 
order, rather than destroying it, although 
destruction itself is part of the great natural cycles 
and tends to signal growth and a new beginning. 
(1993c, p. 77) 
 
Irigaray (1993c) also observes that the “sacrificial order overlays the 
natural rhythms with a different and cumulative temporality that 
dispenses and prevents us from attending to the moment. Once this 
occurs imprecisions multiply and grow. A catharsis becomes 
necessary” (p. 77). The current war in Iraq maintained by the sacrifice 
of many young lives prevents the US from attending to the socio-
political scene with its various crises – environmental, economic, 
health care, etc. Sacrifices, rituals and catharsis become necessary 
when we fail to be respectful of nature and its cycles. But, Irigaray is 
careful not to reify these either, they are also changing, in flux. 
Being attentive to the present means being attentive to the body. 
Being attentive to the body means to be attuned to the information 
from one’s senses. Being attentive to the senses requires a focus on 
the present and not in the past or the future; however, even here 
Irigaray warns us that we need to be cautious about privileging the 
visual over the other senses. Irigaray clarifies, “Vision is effectively a 
sense that can totalize, enclose, in its own way. More than the other 
senses, it is likely to construct a landscape, a horizon” (1993a, p. 
175). In contrast to a visual experience of space that tends to 
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construct an enclosure and master, the tactile has a different 
experience of spatiality. In touch, the person experiences the world in 
the moment and decision-making with regard to movement is not an 
automatic and habitual process but requires mindfulness and 
creativity. In paying attention to the moment we are called upon to be 
more attentive to the present than to the future or the past. Whitford 
(1991) also observes that attending to the present can be conceptually 
linked to both linguistic theory and theology. In relation to linguistic 
theory, attending to the present suggests being present to the subject 
of enunciation and the sexuate identity of the person. In relation to 
theology, the link is to the parousia or the Second coming. Irigaray 
states: 
Does parousia correspond to the expectation of a 
future not only as a utopia or a destiny but also as 
a here and now, the willed construction of bridge in 
the present between the past and the future? ... 
Why do we assume that God must always remain 
an inaccessible transcendence rather than a 
realization – here and now – in and through the 
body? (1993a, p. 147-8) 
 
Irigaray’s rethinking of sacrifice in religion reaffirms the image of the 
divine as embodied and immanent and simultaneously transcendent, 
thus offering a different ideal for woman in her becoming a subject. 
The correlation of the divine and attentiveness to the present is offered 
then as an alternate path to regulating violence and building social 
cohesion and order.  
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3.5 Construction materials for a feminine imaginary  
A feminine imaginary would take into account “the morphology 
of the female body and her relationship to the ground, to the mirror, to 
space and time, and to dwelling” (Whitford, 1991, p. 159). The 
categories that Irigaray proposes constitute the “construction 
materials” for the invention of a language that would house woman in 
consonance with her morphology. Irigaray’s invented categories do not 
substitute for the categories that house the male. Rather, her 
categories resonate with the task of woman-becoming-subject. We can 
say that these categories stand on their own because they do not 
represent the “other of the same,” rather they represent “the other of 
the other.”  
The categories or terms Irigaray proposes not only take into 
account women’s morphology; they also act as mediators between the 
binary oppositions. Irigaray introduces many categories. I would like 
to name a prominent few: the threshold (a space for woman to move 
freely within and without), the mucous (neither liquid nor solid, 
something yet to be theorized, like sexual difference), the angel (a 
mediator that carries the message that the human can become divine). 
I have already addressed one very important term, the sensible 
transcendental in the previous section.   
An important implication of using new construction materials is 
that there will be positive changes in many areas of a woman’s life, 
but particularly in the area of communication between the sexes. 
“Dialogue” requires two sexually different subjects to engage in a 
 63
conversation. Also, decisions cannot be made about the other and for 
the other. The playing field and the rules will have changed. Whitford 
remarks, “What it does mean is that the other sex – the other woman – 
has an imaginary and symbolic existence, so that she cannot be 
incorporated any longer without awareness or acknowledgment” 
(1991, p. 166). Women will have to be included in decision making for 
them or about them and they will not be ignored or subsumed in 
dialogue. 
In this concluding section I will elaborate the term “two lips” 
that Irigaray offers as another construction material for building a 
new symbolic. An understanding of this category/term would enhance 
the creation of a sexually different subject. In her essay, “When Our 
Lips Speak Together,” Irigaray (1985b) asserts, “We are not lacks, 
voids awaiting sustenance, plenitude, fulfillment from the other. By 
our lips we are women: this does not mean that we are focused on 
consuming, consummation, fulfillment” (pp. 209-210). Irigaray uses 
the image of the lips as a metonymic strategy. That is, to evoke 
associations of meaning of what is signified. Here, lips as a metonymic 
device evoke associations that would resonate with woman as a 
sexuate being. 
To unpack the complexity of the image of the two lips, I am 
utilizing Maggie Berg’s “alternative reading of Irigaray’s lips” (1991, p. 
51). Berg begins her reading by stating that she wants to read 
“Irigaray’s lips as a counterpart to Lacan’s phallus” (p. 51) and to 
resolve the apparent contradictions that the image of the two lips 
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evokes in critics. Critics have read it literally and also as a discursive 
strategy. The literal reading reads the two lips as creating an essence 
or definition of women’s identity. I would agree with Berg that such a 
reading is faulty for many reasons. First, as Irigaray herself points out 
the lips do not suggest a regression to anatomy. She chooses the two 
lips for its ambiguity. Besides, biology and/or nature are also 
mediated categories. So the lips are always already situated within a 
cultural understanding. Berg also states that for Irigaray, the words, 
“lips” and “speak” evoke images that refer simultaneously to both 
sexuality and discourse respectively, meaning “the two cannot and 
should not be separated, because one always implies the other” (Berg, 
1991, p. 56). Berg also points out that Irigaray avoids the trap of 
phallocentrism by not presenting the lips to displace the phallus; 
instead she offers them up as in a play of différance, whereby the lips 
“oscillate between signifier and signified” (Berg, 1991, p. 57), not 
contained by any one term. In other words, Berg concludes that in 
contrast to Lacan’s phallus, Irigaray’s lips cannot be pinned down to 
either anatomy or language. In this context, she argues that in the 
case of Lacan, it is almost impossible for the phallus not to be linked 
to anatomy. Grosz raises similar suspicions regarding Lacan’s phallus. 
She observes, “In spite of Lacan’s claims, the phallus is not a ‘neutral’ 
term functioning equally for both sexes, positioning them both in the 
symbolic order. As the word suggests, it is a term privileging 
masculinity, or rather, the penis” (1990, p. 122). In her conclusion, 
Berg states that “Irigaray’s text makes the signified (what goes on in 
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our heads when we read the lips) so rich in connotation that it 
actually transforms the anatomical referent” (1991, p. 70). 
Like Berg, Whitford’s (1991) reading of the “two lips” is based on 
seeing the lips as denoting a relationship of metonymy or contiguity 
rather than a metaphorical (and hierarchical) relationship between 
binary oppositions. Contiguity refers to an association of meaning 
within a context whereas metaphor refers to a substitution of meaning 
based on a socio-linguistic code. Whitford (1991) remarks that Irigaray 
does not use metaphors to address the motif of woman. Rather, she 
uses metonymy to talk about the two lips as well as other categories. 
She writes, “Whereas the paternal genealogy is based on metaphoric 
identification, the maternal genealogy is, or could be based on 
metonymic identification” (Whitford, 1991, p. 180). A maternal 
genealogy that is based on metonymical identifications would allow for 
mother and daughter to coexist and relate as subjects rather than 
subjects and objects. Within the paternal genealogy, the woman would 
relate to the mother as an object. Also, for Irigaray, the lips, unlike the 
phallus, act as threshold. As threshold, the lips cannot be substituted 
or exchanged. Woman’s place cannot be taken by others. In her essay, 
“Gesture in Psychoanalysis,” (1993c) Irigaray refers to the lips in 
contrast to the “fort-da” as a substitutional mechanism used by the 
male to control and master their relations with others. She writes, 
“The fort-da is already a substitutional mechanism, whereas the lips 
are the woman herself, the threshold to a woman that has not been 
distanced by any object” (1993c, p. 102). The lips as threshold do not 
 66
control, master or manipulate. As a rich and associative signified, the 
lips respect the mystery of the radical other.  
In the next chapter, I address the existential phenomenological 
psychology of Ernesto Spinelli. I outline the salient points that 
constitute his theory and praxis. I will show how his therapeutic 
praxis is oblivious to the question of sexual difference.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
The existential phenomenological psychology 
of Ernesto Spinelli 
 
A theory may require that we revise even the 
descriptions of the world on which the theory 
itself is based.   
                                     - Alison Jaggar,  
       Feminist Politics and Human Nature, p. 381 
 
The phenomenological account of the lived body 
and the lived world needs to be complemented 
by the awareness that there is an interaction 
between the lived experience, the imaginary, 
and the discursive and social construction of 
both.   
        - Margaret Whitford,  
          Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, p. 152. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Ernesto Spinelli is both a practicing existential psychotherapist 
and an academic. He is known for his development of the “self-
construct,” his emphasis on the inter-relational dimension of the 
psychotherapeutic relationship, and the clarification of the inter-
subjective factors that underlie an existential theory of human 
sexuality. 
Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy is a product of the tradition 
of European existentialism and phenomenology. Spinelli’s articulation 
of existential psychotherapy is indebted to the existential 
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phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, 
Maurice-Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre (Spinelli, 2001; Spinelli, 
2004). For example, Spinelli suggests ways to resolve human conflict 
based on Sartre’s phenomenological exploration of the “gaze of the 
other” (Spinelli, 2004, p. 58). Using Heidegger’s understanding of 
language as transformative versus representational, Spinelli (2001) 
articulates the link between language and art. He remarks, “We suffer 
our artistic endeavours, just as we suffer language, in order that both 
we and the world may be revealed and transformed” (2001, p. 137). 
Last but not least, Spinelli’s attempts to “reconfigure human 
sexuality” are directly influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of 
the body as the “vehicle of being-in-the-world and a basic form of the 
appearance (manifestation) of the world itself” (2001, p. 82). 
In this chapter, I will review Spinelli’s theory of existential 
psychotherapy, especially the features that are relevant to sexual 
difference. I will detail his “inter-relational” approach which, while 
clinically nuanced enough to represent an advance, fails to examine 
the theoretical and practical consequences of sexual difference. 
 
4.2 The existential psychotherapy of Ernesto Spinelli 
Although Spinelli calls himself an “existential psychotherapist,” 
he does not distinguish his practice and thinking from what he 
identifies as “the enterprise of phenomenological enquiry” (2006, p. 2). 
He observes that its primary task is to “illuminate and disclose the 
make-up, or way of being, of any given structure in its form of 
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meaning” (2006, p. 2). He writes, “Indeed it is my contention that we 
can consider existential psychotherapy as an expression of 
phenomenological research in terms of its shared aims, methods of 
enquiry and, perhaps most significantly, its values in general and 
specifically its values regarding inter-relatedness” (2006, p. 2). 
Consequently, as an existential psychotherapist, Spinelli believes 
client issues (dilemmas, disorders, disturbances, and so on) “originate 
from, and are embodied expressions of, the client’s ongoing overall 
interpersonal relations” (2006, p. 2). In his discussion of the inter-
subjective realm, he also uses other terms (like, “interpersonal,” 
and/or “inter-relational”) to mean the same. Psychoanalysis had its 
own “inter-relational” and/or “inter-subjective” turn, initiated around 
the latter half of the 20th century (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002; 
Sullivan, 1953). Briefly, psychoanalysis shifted its focus from paying 
attention to the intra-psychic reality of the analysand to his/her inter-
subjective reality. These psychoanalysts did not forget the intra-
psychic dimension, however, but saw it as part of the inter-subjective.  
Practitioners of existential psychotherapy do not attempt the 
removal or “symptom reduction” of clients’ “problematic” thoughts, 
behaviors, and affects. Instead, Spinelli asserts:  
[T]ogether with the client, they attempt to expose 
and consider these symptoms as interrelated 
expressions of the client’s wider ‘way of being’ so 
that the implications of their maintenance, 
reduction or removal for that ‘way of being’ can be 
considered and evaluated. (2006, p. 3) 
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4.3 Salient features of Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy 
4. 3. 1 The self-construct as an alternative to the concept of self 
Like many theorists in his tradition, Spinelli begins with a 
critique of the Western notion of the self. He delineates several 
assumptions about self that “permeate as a whole or in part our 
psychological theories, our sociopolitical laws and precepts, our moral 
and ethical codes” (2001, p. 39). Subsequent attempts at defining the 
self have been nothing but the “permutation” of these assumptions 
(2001, p. 40) and remain problematic and not attuned to lived 
experience. In this context, Spinelli states that contemporary social 
scientists’ observations show that when we attempt to define 
something elusive, we use metaphorical language “to provide a 
(supposed) clarity to that which remains mysterious” (2001, p. 40). As 
he points out, metaphors are often culturally over-determined and 
limited in scope, so their use comes with a price. Spinelli claims that 
“If metaphors allow us to ‘see’, they do so by framing the boundaries 
both of what is seen and how it is seen” (2001, p. 41).  Spinelli himself 
uses a metaphor of a mirror to suggest how metaphors constrain 
meaning. He explains, “If every metaphor provides a mirror, it also 
provides a hammer with which to demolish all other potential mirrors 
that, placed at different angles, would provoke competing or 
contradictory transformative metaphors” (2001, p. 41).   
Instead of the ambiguous and problematic term “self” to 
describe what it means to be human, Spinelli proposes “self-
construct” or “self-structure” as alternatives. He observes that 
 71
although the term “self-construct” operates metaphorically, it retains 
the “fluid, process-like experience of being human” (2001, p. 47) 
rather than the static “thing-like” entity implied by “self.” This shift in 
terminology allows for holding contradictory beliefs simultaneously. 
Spinelli explains, “Indeed, this very incapacity to define the 
constituents of the self-structure in any final or fixed sense seems to 
me to be the crux of any movement towards what may be labelled 
authenticity” (2001, p. 53). His characterization of the term “self-
construct” suggests a parallel in meaning to Irigaray’s fluid-like 
structure of femininity. The difference however, is that Spinelli’s “self-
construct” is founded on the assumptions of a mono-sexual economy. 
4. 3. 2 The existential psychotherapist’s role as “attendant” and 
“other” 
Spinelli notes that psychotherapy “has increasingly tended to 
become an ally of dominant cultural assumptions rather than one of 
culture’s most trenchant critics” (2001, p. 18). The therapist’s allying 
him- or herself with normative assumptions regarding what it is to be 
human means that aspects of the therapist’s or client’s world that are 
inconsistent with these assumptions are either excluded or by default 
pathologized. By colluding with the status quo, Spinelli observes, 
“psychotherapy, however inadvertently, has blunted its socially critical 
edge” (2001, p.19). By evicting the world from the consulting room, 
psychotherapy has “encased itself within a set of restrictive 
interventions” (2001, p. 19) and will continue to stagnate in its 
mediocrity. 
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To break out of this dismal situation, Spinelli proposes a model 
of existential psychotherapy wherein the therapist’s role “shifts from 
that of helper, healer and instructor back to its original meaning of 
‘attendant’ – one who walks beside you and, through being with you, 
illuminates not just your world, but all worlds as well” (2001, p. 20). 
As an attendant, the therapist invites the world into the consulting 
room and thus “shake(s) psychotherapy out of the hermetically sealed 
and arcane confines of the ‘special and exclusive’ relationship between 
client and psychotherapist” (2001, p. 19).   
Spinelli points out that as an attendant, the existential therapist 
also assumes the role of an “other” to the client. As such, the therapist 
“acts as a representative of all others in the client’s wider world 
relations” (Spinelli, 2007, p. 59). The therapist’s mode of engagement 
as “other” is unique. As such, the therapist “may both clarify and 
challenge any number of the client’s dispositional stances about how 
others are, and how others expect the client to be, and how the client 
expects others to be with him or her” (2007, p. 60). Spinelli proposes 
that the therapist as an “other” must initially accept the presenting 
self-construct of the client; that is, how the client constructs him- or 
herself in relation to others. 
To clarify this stance of the therapist as “other,” Spinelli utilizes 
the insights of Martin Buber, a twentieth-century educator and 
philosopher. According to Spinelli, Buber posits two types of inter-
subjective relations, the I-Thou and the I-It.  Spinelli likens his 
understanding of the therapist as “other” to Buber’s I-Thou relation 
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which promotes an “inclusive” otherness rather than the “objectifying” 
I-It relations. Spinelli characterizes the I-Thou relation as based on 
reciprocity rather than empathy. Spinelli explains:  
As Buber viewed it, empathy requires the therapist 
to treat the client as merely another version of ‘I’ 
and, thus, stays attuned only to a projected image 
of him or her self, thereby remaining unwilling to 
include the otherness of the client within the 
therapeutic stance. As a consequence, the client’s 
response to the therapist’s empathy is to continue 
to experience the therapist as an unrelated ‘other’. 
If the I-It attitude is grounded in an insistence upon 
the separateness of ‘the other’, the I-Thou attitude 
promotes a reciprocity or meeting between each 
‘other’. The former equally objectifies both the ‘I’ 
and the ‘It’. The latter reveals that both ‘I’ and 
‘Thou’ co-exist as inseparable poles of interrelation. 
(2007, p. 112) 
 
Some of the qualities that shape an existential therapist based on 
reciprocity are reflection, challenge, and making explicit what is 
implicit.  
The following therapeutic interaction, between Spinelli and 
Elizabeth, a thirty-two-year-old terminally ill with lung cancer, 
illustrates how he applied his theory:  
‘Am I in denial?’ Elizabeth asks. ‘Am I acting 
as though it will just go away? That I’ll wake up and 
find that this has been just another nightmare? 
 ‘Are you?’ I ask back.  …. 
 Elizabeth gazes at me, intrigued and 
exasperated by my prodding. She … agrees to 
humour me. ‘When I die,’ she states, ‘I want others 
to say that I took care of myself.  Isn’t that absurd?’ 
 ‘And if you didn’t? I say. ‘If you stopped 
taking care of your body and the others recognized 
this. Then what?’ 
 ‘I couldn’t stand it. I’d be betraying my own 
principles.’ 
 ‘And to live up to your principles, even at the 
point of your dying, is of vital importance to you.’ 
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 ‘Yes.  Yes, I suppose it is.’ 
 ‘Even if, as you said earlier, it’s all 
meaningless.’  
My comment shakes her. (Spinelli, 1997, p. 192) 
 
While Spinelli is undoubtedly compassionate in his approach to 
Elizabeth, he also maintains a relationship of I-Thou with her as 
evidenced in his strategies of dialogical interaction. By differentiating 
between the I-Thou and I-It relations, Spinelli outlines qualities that a 
therapist as “other” should possess. The therapist should be willing: 
[To] be with the client (i.e. to respect the client’s way 
of being as valid and meaningful) and to be for the 
client (i.e. to attempt entry into the client’s way of 
being in order to clarify its underlying values, 
beliefs, and so forth). (1997, p. 89)   
 
For instance, in the vignette presented above, Spinelli demonstrates 
respect when he chooses not to provide Elizabeth with answers to her 
queries regarding whether she was in denial; instead, he turns the 
question back to her in an effort to be with her as she struggles to 
clarify it for herself. In sum, the existential psychotherapist as “other” 
acts as a presence and an impact that challenges the current self-
construct of the client with respect and openness. 
4. 3. 3 The dialogical realms of encounter  
In his practice, Spinelli attempts to address three dialogical 
realms of therapeutic encounter: “the I-focused, you-focused and we-
focused” (2006, p. 3).  These dialogical realms are understood as 
possible ways of being within a therapeutic encounter. Briefly stated, 
the I-focused realm is one in which the therapist works to clarify the 
experience of being him- or herself in the therapeutic relationship; the 
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you-focused realm is one in which the therapist works to clarify the 
therapist’s experience of the client’s experience of the therapist; and 
the we-focused realm is one in which the therapist works to clarify 
both participants’ experience of each other. Spinelli states that since 
the “we-focused realm of encounter is characterized by its immediacy” 
(2006, p. 3), the therapist places a premium on this realm so that the 
therapist “can attempt to ‘enter’, with increasing adequacy, the 
currently lived-world of the client” (2006, p. 3). The third dialogical 
realm can be justified as more immediate than the others, based on 
the fact that “immediacy re-connects that which is being stated with the 
being who is making the statement” (Spinelli, 2007, p.132). Focusing 
on the third realm’s experiential component, the existential 
psychotherapist aims for a “real and valid” interaction between himself 
and his client because of its potential to be unmediated and present. 
He explains:  
The existential psychotherapist’s willingness to 
examine and consider what emerges experientially 
through this realm as being real and valid (rather 
than substitutive, symbolic, or ‘transferential’) 
serves to implicate his or her current manner of 
existence as expressed through the interactive 
relationship with the client. This focus further 
serves to expose and clarify in the immediacy of the 
current encounter the self-same inter-relational 
issues that clients express as being deeply 
problematic within their wider world relations. 
(2007, p. 132) 
 
The underlying belief is that the “immediacy of the current 
encounter” is crucial as it provides a microcosmic view of the client’s 
wider way of being in the world.   
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Spinelli also discusses a fourth inter-relational realm, viz., the 
they-focused realm. This encompasses the others of the client’s world 
and their views of his or her way of being. Spinelli notes that this 
realm is highly significant when the client begins to consider 
“alternative ‘ways to be’” (2007, p. 4). For instance, a client (an inmate 
in jail) in the course of therapy stated the following: “Last Saturday, 
when I saw my daughter during visitation, I believe that she feels that 
she must blame herself in some way.”  The statement is an indication 
that the client is beginning to consider other ways to be as he begins 
to view his situation from others’ perspective.  
4. 3. 4  Body and sexuality as inter-relational  
Spinelli acknowledges his indebtedness to Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the body and sexuality. Based on his close reading 
of Merleau-Ponty, Spinelli considers the body to be not a thing among 
other things but that which “expresses a unique dialogue with the 
world” (2001, p. 82). The body also “reflect(s) our way of projecting 
towards the world and our responses to the world’s projecting of itself 
towards us” (1997, p. 187). In this sense, the body is inter-relational.  
Spinelli’s own understanding of sexuality is consonant with Merleau-
Ponty’s in which sexual encounters are seen as “a pivotal means with 
which to express our presence to ‘the other’ and, in turn, to express 
the presence of ‘the other’ to ourselves” (2001, p. 82). He claims that 
Merleau-Ponty is not interested “in the issues of male or female 
sexuality, sexual orientation or the sociopolitical dimensions of 
sexuality” (2001, p. 82), but rather in sexuality “as it is revealed in its 
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inter-relational dimensions” (2001, p. 83). Spinelli’s gloss (which I will 
address in the next section) of Merleau-Ponty’s account of sexuality is 
significant, both in relation to his account of the therapeutic process 
and the role of sexual difference therein. 
 To sum up, Spinelli’s existential therapy respects the inter-
subjective dimension and is in line with the sound principles of 
existential phenomenological psychology. For instance, his strategy of 
exploring and clarifying the client’s world with respect and openness 
is evidence of his in-depth understanding of existential 
phenomenology. His non-recognition of the question of sexual 
difference however, is shown in his unexamined assumptions 
regarding the foundation of inter-subjectivity. I will examine his key 
concepts as seen in his theory and practice and show how the 
exclusion of the question of sexual difference mars his own attempt at 
not becoming an ally of the “dominant cultural assumptions” (2001, p. 
18). 
 
4.4 Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy vis-à-vis sexual 
difference  
Spinelli describes existential-phenomenological theory as 
underscoring “that our experience of living is never certain, never fully 
predictable, never secure” (1997, p. 6), but that we can choose to 
respond to this uncertainty in a myriad of ways. Even choosing not to 
choose is a choice. He adds that, whatever the response, it itself 
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“expresses the stance we take toward our relations with the world” 
(1997, p. 6). For instance, when a client reports that he declined an 
offer to smoke marijuana, his choice expresses his stance towards his 
relations with himself and others: his stance towards his own health 
(perhaps to breathe clean air and to prolong his existence), his 
psychological well-being (not to be conditioned by a habit and/or not 
to lose motivation), and towards others (being secure enough to stand 
on his own).  
From the perspective of existential phenomenology, if our 
responses reveal the stance we take towards our relations with the 
world, how do they reveal our sexually differentiated position? As 
regards others, how do they reveal our acknowledgment of a sexually 
different other? Would not our responses reveal a different stance at a 
fundamental level based on our specific sexuality? In other words, if 
our response (as being-in-the-world) is always already subtended by 
sexual difference, then our response to the uncertain and the 
unknown is going to be different, given that we are man and woman, 
two sexually different subjects.   
Sexual difference, however, is not salient in Spinelli’s 
understanding of the workings of inter-subjectivity. Perhaps this is 
not surprising, given that sexual difference is rarely addressed within 
the existential-phenomenological tradition. This fact is acknowledged 
by Spinelli’s peers, Emmy van Deurzen and Raymond Kenward (2005) 
who state: 
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There is much in the area of sexuality that 
existential theorists have yet to consider. For 
instance, to be sexual is to be differentiated from 
the other sex, and to be sexual is to be incomplete 
(men and women are each half of the reproductive 
process). There is an opportunity to analyse what it 
means to be a man, what it means to be a woman, 
to examine maternity and paternity, childbearing 
and the experience of childbirth, and men’s 
presence and absence in procreation, of 
relationships with the same-sex and opposite-sex 
parents, of homosexuality, bi-sexuality, 
masturbation, of rape (violence is always a 
possibility in human relationships), and of the 
relationship between sex and love. (Van Deurzen & 
Kenward, 2005, p. 185) 
 
Although the authors contend that there is a lack of discussion of 
sexual difference within existential phenomenology, their own remarks 
are problematic. For instance, their idea that “to be sexual is to be 
incomplete” carries a normative assumption that men and women are 
complementary. Also, the statement “men and women are each half of 
the reproductive process” assumes that gay parents could not be part 
of the reproductive and familial process.    
Spinelli claims that the existential therapist takes the position 
of “the other” in psychotherapy. Briefly, as an “other,” the therapist 
will stand in as the representative of all the others in the client’s 
world. By claiming to be able to stand on two sides of a divide, Spinelli 
assumes a reciprocal relation by which the therapist can stand in for 
the other. But as long as a “culture of the relationship between 
genders” (Irigaray, 2000, p. 91) is not spelled out in qualitative terms, 
Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy runs the risk of reducing the other 
to the status of the same. Irigaray (2000) herself characterizes inter-
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subjectivity as the positive outcome of the acknowledgment of sexual 
difference:   
The difference between woman and man allows for 
an inter-subjectivity that wouldn’t subject the one 
and the other to nature, to the same, to the equal, 
to imperatives, to laws, to their external realities. 
This requires that the one and the other recognize 
their own limits in that they belong to only one 
gender. To be a woman means not to be a man and 
to be a man means not to be a woman. This not 
becomes an instrument and a place for each 
person’s identity and a creative, and not only 
procreative, intentional relationship between the 
two to be established. Being able to identify with the 
other seems to me an ambiguous cultural 
improvement. (2000, p. 91) 
 
From the perspective of sexual difference, Spinelli’s therapeutic 
implementation of what he calls “reciprocity” is naive. In Irigaray’s 
book I love to you, she explains the insertion of the linking proposition 
“to” into the verb in the following manner: “I love to you means I 
maintain a relation of indirection to you.  I do not subjugate you or 
consume you. I respect you (as irreducible)” (1996, p. 109). But the I-
Thou relation that Spinelli advocates is characterized by a relation of 
reciprocity that does not take into account sexual difference. In this 
sense, his I-Thou relation characterizes the other as an “other of the 
same” and not as an “other of the other.” So for instance, “woman” 
within the I-Thou economy of relations is simply an “other” (an “other 
of the same”) and not radically different.  
Based on Irigaray’s deconstruction of Western religion, the I-
Thou relation can be situated as mirroring man-God relations. Within 
this model, the Thou implies the monotheistic male God. Irigaray 
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makes explicit what is implicit in the evocation of the other or the 
Thou in inter-subjective relations:  
In the history of our culture, there’s much talk of I. 
Thou (Tu) and the other are also evoked – whether 
with reference to my neighbor or to a totally other 
God, the Thou of certain philosophers or a theology 
that forgets that this you (tu) is generally a he. But 
these I’s and you’s, which seem self-evident within 
the bounds of a delimited field, remain vague and 
abstract. We only have to talk about the concrete 
existence of living men and women for us to falter 
over the question of who is this I and who is you. Do 
you love me? the woman says to the man. I wonder 
if I am loved, he replies. How can we be formed, 
then? (1996, p. 48) 
 
Whitford concurs, offering a corrective to a mono-sexual economy via 
Irigaray’s notion of the sensible transcendental: 
The Other has always been seen by men as God, 
but never as the other sex. The ‘You’ is always 
addressed to the transcendental, never to women. 
With a sensible transcendental, the exchange 
between the ‘you’ and the ‘I’ could take place in the 
here and now, with each sex assuming its own ‘I’ 
and addressing its ‘you’ to a transcendent other. 
(1991, 147)   
 
By not addressing the phallocentric economy of relations, 
Spinelli, a strong proponent of inter-subjectivity, inadvertently 
colludes with its assumptions. His other, is a substitutable other. 
That is, woman as other is a reflection, a complement, an opposite to 
man. By assuming sameness within an inter-relational realm, 
communication between two subjects cannot be considered dialogical. 
As Irigaray observes:  
This dialogical relation between man and woman … 
remains to be invented, almost entirely from 
scratch. It represents an important stage in human 
civilization that has yet to be accomplished. It 
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requires man and woman to be faithful to their 
gender and to start communicating from their 
differences, and not get rid of them. (2000, p. 85) 
 
 Spinelli’s assumption of a sexually neutral other also affects his 
understanding of the body as expressing a “unique dialogue with the 
world” (1997, p. 187). In one of his eight stories of existential therapy 
(Tales of Un-knowing), Spinelli (1997) describes his work with a 
teenage girl named Amanda and her relationship to her body. Her 
presenting issue can be summed up as not liking herself, in particular 
her body. During the course of therapy, Spinelli and Amanda come to 
recognize how she had come to disown her body, and to understand 
how this manifested itself in her relationships with others and herself. 
According to Spinelli, her recognition of disowning her body opened up 
for her the gradual possibility of re-owning her body and accepting its 
power to control others, as well as the possibility of accepting the need 
to let go of her attempts to control her body.  
Spinelli’s analysis of Amanda’s self-construct as a struggle in 
terms of her body vis-à-vis her lived experience is pertinent. He states: 
Her lived experience provided her with contradictory 
messages: on the one hand, it told her that it was 
not enough to be judged and appreciated simply as 
a body. On the other, it demonstrated to her over 
and over again that that was precisely the one way 
that others did judge and appreciate her. (Spinelli, 
1997, p. 50) 
 
His analysis of Amanda’s conflict reveals a problem that reflects the 
neglect of sexual difference. In the use of the phrase, “to be judged 
and appreciated simply as a body,” Spinelli slips into the traditional 
image of the body as a cohesive and coherent phenomenon, a neutral 
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entity. But the body is never a neutral or even a cohesive and coherent 
phenomenon. It is always already formed through a process of 
“internalization of images, representations and signifying practices” 
(Grosz, 1989, p. 112). Culturally, women experience being “controlled” 
by their bodies according to a sexually specific meaning: for example, 
through sexual objectification, subjugation, and rape, but also 
pregnancy, menstruation, and the emphasis placed on women’s 
appearance. By ignoring the fundamental sexual contouring of the 
body, Spinelli falls into the mistake of neutralizing the body and 
ignoring the sexual inscriptions on the body. 
Amanda’s interpersonal experience in therapy, according to 
Spinelli helped her “to begin to re-own that self-same body and change 
her relationship to it” (1997, p. 50) which in turn freed her to explore 
“novel possibilities, new perspectives” (1997, p. 51). Spinelli tells us 
that Amanda “embark(s) upon a series of casual sexual relationships” 
(1997, p. 51) and “literally experiment(s) with her body-shape, adding 
and losing weight, immersing herself in a life of strenuous exercise or 
utmost indolence” (1997, p. 52), eventually reaching a balanced body-
image. Amanda’s choices towards her body are subtended by what 
Irigaray would characterize as a “masculine model of sexuality 
described by Freud: tension, discharge, return to homeostasis, etc.” 
(1993c, p. 76). Amanda’s stances towards her body seem to progress 
according to the law of thermodynamics whereby equilibrium is 
reached after an expenditure of energy.  
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If for Spinelli the body is neutral and mono-sexual in the sense 
delineated above, then how does that affect his understanding of 
subjectivity? Spinelli makes certain assumptions regarding 
subjectivity through his notions of freedom and transcendence. His 
understanding of freedom is inherited from his predecessors – 
existential philosophers like Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and Jean-Paul Sartre (Spinelli, 1997; 2001). In a pedagogical 
description of his praxis entitled “Her Last Breath,” Spinelli walks us 
through his encounter with his client Elizabeth (referred to earlier in 
this chapter) who is dying from lung cancer. They arrive at an 
important juncture in therapy when they clarify her relationship to 
her body. Elizabeth states that despite her body betraying her “in 
such a total fashion,” she will not betray it. She asserts that when she 
dies, she “want(s) others to say that (she) took care of (herself)” 
(Spinelli, 1977, p. 193). For Elizabeth, being faithful to her body (even 
though, at this time in her life, whatever her body means to her is 
slipping away) though apparently meaningless “remains important to 
(her), determines what remains of (her) life’s possibilities” (Spinelli, 
1997, 193). Spinelli mulls over her statement:  
Listening carefully to her words, I wonder 
whether this could be a statement of strength. 
Certainly, it might be interpreted as such; many 
would judge it in this fashion.  But I remain 
cautious in jumping to this conclusion. I don’t know 
whether Elizabeth experiences this principle as 
something which she has chosen or which has 
imposed itself upon her. The difference between ‘I 
can’ and ‘I must’ seems crucial here since while the 
former permits openness towards one’s experience 
and forgiveness for the imperfect consequences that 
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emerge, the latter imposes a stance that rejects all 
options save the one deemed ‘correct’ or 
‘permissible’ and punishes anything less than 
perfection. (1997, p. 193) 
 
Spinelli cautiously considers Elizabeth’s statement regarding her body 
and does not want to accept it as a “statement of strength.” He is 
unsure whether Elizabeth’s principle about her treatment of her body 
is based on a free and conscious choice, meaning “I can,” or whether it 
is motivated by her restrictive self-construct “I must,” meaning “I must 
be good to my body so that others will …” Spinelli’s task of clarifying 
and challenging the client’s self-construct (irrespective of his/her 
gender) rests on the idea that a free, transcendent body is that of a 
white, male, adult body.  
For Spinelli, an “I can” stance of openness towards experience 
discounts women’s sexuation. This oversight reflects his own theory of 
subjectivity, which only acknowledges one subject, the male. Spinelli 
maintains that the “self-construct” is continually challenged in its 
inter-relations with others; however, he does not consider the impact 
of the socio-cultural inscriptions on the body. In this sense, Spinelli’s 
intervention succeeds in keeping the socio-cultural perception of the 
body out of the consulting room.  
If Spinelli assumes that the subject is sexually neutral, how 
does that affect his notion of death anxiety? Spinelli notes that 
contemporary Western society tends to expel death and anything 
associated with it. He explains, “This expulsion of death as an 
inherent feature of life appears to have as its impetus the attempt to 
 86
avoid all confrontation with mystery; it is our effort to eradicate the 
fear of the unknown” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 155). For instance, he points 
out how in the West the “the cult of youth” (2001, p. 155) has been 
elevated to such an extent that cosmetics and plastic surgery are 
routinely used to make people look young. In this context, Spinelli 
argues that the term “death anxiety” may be misleading. In line with 
Heidegger’s thinking, he observes, “It is not death, per se, that 
provokes our fears and concerns; rather, it is the recognition of the 
fragility of our existence” (1997, p. 9). Spinelli also maintains that how 
each one of us deals with death anxiety “is likely to be as varied and 
unique as our experience of being alive” (1997, p. 10). His attitude 
assumes that both men’s and women’s ways of negotiating death 
anxiety are not based on being sexually different but simply on being 
human.  
According to Spinelli, when dealing with death anxiety or 
recognizing our vulnerability as human beings, our response falls 
between the two extremes of either sheltering ourselves in a lifestyle 
that is “bounded by regime and habit” (1997, p. 10) or abandoning 
ourselves into a life of “defiance of security and predictability” (1997, 
p. 10). Spinelli’s characterization of the two stances in dealing with 
death anxiety evokes metaphors that are reminiscent of the Freudian 
model of sexuality: “holding back” (requiring discipline) or “discharge” 
(abandonment) – operating according to the two principles of 
thermodynamics (tension & discharge) which helps towards returning 
of a mechanism to homeostasis (Irigaray, 1993b, p. 115; Irigaray, 
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1993c, p. 76). Irigaray contends that the model of thermodynamics to 
deal with life’s realities is ill-suited to female sexuality. Instead she 
suggests an economy that is “more related to becoming, more attuned 
to the time of the universe” (1993b, p. 115). She contends that the 
female economy of sexuality will have to take into account “irreversible 
events that define the stages of her life” (1993b, p. 115) based on a 
different sense of temporality, a temporality related to a different 
rhythm, a rhythm that is in consonance with the cosmos. 
In the final chapter of The Mirror and the Hammer, Spinelli 
(2001) suggests possibilities for existential psychotherapy in a chapter 
titled “Towards a more humane psychotherapy.” To make sense of the 
complex workings of existential psychotherapy, Spinelli utilizes the 
metaphor of chaos theory from contemporary physics. Chaos theory 
arose as an alternative model to linear-based models of physics that 
used cause and effect to explain outcomes in complex systems. 
Spinelli understands chaos theory to hold the view that “the behavior 
of complex systems, while clearly not random and unpredictable … 
can only begin to be discerned when investigators cease seeking to 
place them within the confines of linearly causal analyses” (2001, p. 
173). According to Spinelli, the implication of chaos theory for 
existential psychotherapy is that “sudden radical linearly irrational 
change” (2001, p. 174) is a fundamental given within a complex 
system like human behaviors. Like chaos theory, he suggests that 
psychotherapy needs to move away from the urge to control and 
predict, and “approach matters from the standpoint of a new 
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proposition … based, centrally, upon the acceptance of that mutual 
revelatory disclosure that is the expression of inter-relational 
encounter” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 175). By invoking the metaphor of chaos 
theory to understand the complexity of existential psychotherapy, 
Spinelli affirms that the inter-relational encounter offers the 
possibility for non-linear change.  
Irigaray also looks to science for a model, but for one that would 
suit female subjectivity. In contrast to the thermodynamic model of 
psychoanalysis, Irigaray (2002) subscribes to the contemporary 
Belgian physicist Ilya Prigogine’s model of “dissipative structures.” She 
explains:  
Female sexuality may harmonize better, if we must 
evoke a scientific model, with what Prigogine calls 
‘dissipative’ structures, which function through 
exchange with the outside world, which proceed in 
energy states, and whose ordering is based not on 
seeking equilibrium, but on crossing thresholds 
corresponding to leaving disorder or entropy 
behind, without discharge. (Irigaray, 2002, p. 253) 
 
While Spinelli’s reliance on “chaos theory” reaffirms his 
understanding of existential psychotherapy as a model that does not 
seek linear causal explanations for human behaviors, his 
understanding of this model fails to take into account sexual 
difference. That is, although the sexuation of human beings do not 
“cause” behaviors, they can “in-form” human choices. Ignoring this 
can impact what happens within the inter-subjective realm. While the 
clients will feel liberated and be open to exploring various novel 
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possibilities in their relation to their bodies or others, their underlying 
assumptions regarding their subjectivity will remain unchallenged.   
Metaphors come in handy again for Spinelli in another 
characterization of the inter-relational encounter between the 
therapist and the client. Here he utilizes the metaphor of the mirror 
and the hammer to frame “the meeting of self with other” (2001, 
p.175). Spinelli explains what transpires in the inter-relational 
encounter. He states, “Such meetings, like that between mirror and a 
hammer, may well be shattering. Yet, through their collision, the 
human truths that truly matter to us all, and that are our humanity, 
may stand revealed” (2001, p. 175). Two words stand out in this 
metaphor: “collision” and “shattering.” Both words describe actions 
pertaining to the metaphysics of solids, which collide and shatter. In 
the collision of the mirror and the hammer, Spinelli characterizes the 
outcome to be “shattering.” From the fragments, our humanity will 
stand revealed. This meeting between the self and the other (or 
“intimacy” as Spinelli calls it) is marked by violence. These metaphors 
also evoke “masculine” images of stability, rigidity, solidity, inertness, 
stasis, and “aggressive” images of noise, and fragmentation. 
Psychotherapeutic interventions that are framed in phallic terms will 
have to either exclude women or subsume them.  
Why not a mutual exchange that reveals the truth about sexual 
difference? That would require an imaginary that is subtended by the 
economy of the fluids, an economy that is in consonance with the 
feminine experience of encounters. Another question worth asking in 
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this context is: what kind of sex does the mirror reflect? Or better still, 
does the mirror reflect any sex at all? The fragments of the mirror 
shattered by the hammer will not necessarily take into account a 
(sexually) different other; rather, it only reflects the image presented to 
it, namely, the “other of the same.”  
Irigaray (1991) describes the encounter between two sexually 
different persons in amorous terms. She writes: 
This autistic, egological, solitary love does not 
correspond to the shared outpouring, to the loss of 
boundaries which takes place for both lovers when 
they cross the boundary of the skin into the 
mucous membranes of the body, leaving the circle 
which encloses my solitude to meet in a shared 
space, a shared breath, abandoning the relatively 
dry and precise outlines of each body’s solid 
exterior to enter a fluid universe where the 
perception of being two persons [de la dualité] 
becomes indistinct, and above all, acceding to 
another energy, neither that of the one nor that of 
the other, but an energy produced together and as a 
result of the irreducible difference of sex. (1991, p. 
180) 
 
For Irigaray, the meeting of two sexually different persons is 
subtended by the metaphysics of the fluids. The loss of boundaries 
does not lead to a fusion of the two or to a shattering of one or the 
other.  
In my concluding chapter, I will take up in detail Irigaray’s 
response to the metaphysics of the solids that permeate Western 
thought. I will also show why sexual difference is privileged in my 
reading of Spinelli’s work. I will also discuss the problems that Spinelli 
faces in his theory and practice based on his restrictive understanding 
of embodiment and his use of masculine metaphors in understanding 
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the construction of existential psychotherapy. I also hope to show that 
by paying attention to sexual difference, Spinelli’s existential 
psychotherapy can benefit from being attuned to creative possibilities 
that emerge as the therapist listens to the body speaking with a 
different ear. I also want to show that when the therapist can move 
beyond the constrictions of a phallocentric discourse, sexual 
difference as a non-phallic relation to language and body will 
structure inter-subjectivity. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I am, therefore, a political militant for the 
impossible, which is not to say utopian. Rather, 
I want what is yet to be as the only possibility 
of a future.   
        - Luce Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 10. 
 
5.1 Sexual difference as foundational 
My analysis of Spinelli’s theory and practice of existential 
psychotherapy shows that he has neglected the question of sexual 
difference. In this chapter I will discuss this neglect and its 
implications. Subsequently, I will also use Irigaray’s insights to 
respond to the issues raised in my analysis of Spinelli’s praxis. I will 
discuss the possible direction that this Irigarayan critique can offer to 
Spinelli’s existential therapy. Before I proceed, however, I want to 
address an inevitable question: “Why privilege sexual difference when 
analyzing Spinelli’s praxis? What about other differences that also 
mediate man-woman relations and which he also neglects, like race, 
culture, and class? What makes sexual difference different?” 
Many of Irigaray’s critiques have raised questions regarding her 
emphasis on sexual difference. Some of her critics point out that her 
undue emphasis on sexual difference has precluded her from paying 
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attention to other differences. Patricia J. Huntington (1998), for 
instance, criticizes Irigaray for elevating sexual difference in her 
exploration of identity. For Huntington, race, class, and other matrices 
are “coextensive features of [a] symbolic reality that refer to the 
tension between being and nonbeing, having and not having” (1998, p. 
255). Essentially, critics argue that Irigaray privileges sexual 
difference and makes other differences secondary.  
Irigaray responds simply that other differences cannot be 
adequately considered without confronting the questions raised by 
sexual difference (and vice versa). For Irigaray, sexual difference is not 
mediated by biology or some ontological difference between what 
culture identifies as “man” and “woman,” but a particular relationship 
to the body and language that structures inter-subjectivity. Her 
understanding of sexual difference clearly does not exclude the 
significance of other differences in the understanding of inter-
subjectivity. While she is wary of any attempts at submerging 
difference to sameness, she nevertheless recognizes a lack in the area 
of difference. She states, “We are still lacking a culture of between-
sexes, of between-races, of between-traditions, etc” (Irigaray, 2002, p. 
139). She also recognizes that sexual, class, race, or sexual identity 
differences are fairly fundamental to how we are constituted as men 
and women. Each one of the above issues is structured in relation to 
the other. They have in their evolution been dependent on each other, 
as for instance, when the issues of race intersect with the issues of 
gender or class. Irigaray, however, privileges sexual difference because 
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it is not displaced yet across cultures. Historically, sexual difference is 
seen as more fundamental than other differences. She adds, “(B)eing 
interested in it cannot, in any case, result in any privilege, but 
forgetting its importance can. Because the way in which sexual 
relations are organized in a society, in a culture, can create privileges” 
(2000, pp. 166-167). Furthermore, Irigaray maintains that questioning 
the assumptions that sustain sexual differentiation can affect all other 
relations. Based on her observations of other cultures, Irigaray argues 
that differences between them, for instance, “come from more or less 
hierarchical treatments of the relations between genders” (2000, pp. 
166-167). For example, hierarchical class relations and gender based 
relations are collated in the phrases, “head of the table,” “head of the 
class,” or “head of the state.” The implications of such a positioning 
indicate gender-based hierarchal relations. 
Irigaray further states, “The duality of the sexes cuts across all 
races, all cultures, all traditions. It is therefore possible to organize a 
society starting from this difference” (2002a, p. 136). She also notes 
that privileging sexual difference is crucial to human relations 
because “the instinct to possess the other’s body like a property” 
(2000, p. 98) is universal.  
If a study of sexual difference as an absence (as established in 
my preceding chapters) reveals the importance of respecting others, 
then this respect can be extended to other differences as well. As 
Irigaray proposes, “Respect of the other gender, the most difficult kind 
of respect since it leads from the most instinctive to the most spiritual, 
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can bring us to respect other differences: race, generation, tradition, 
language, and culture” (2000, p. 99). Irigaray observes that preserving 
this respect for the sexual other is difficult because “the instinct to 
possess the other’s body like a property” (2000, p. 98) continues to 
subsist as a natural given in the relations between men and women. 
For Irigaray, the complexity involved in the relations between man and 
woman, can be a powerful guide in our efforts at learning to respect 
other differences. In fact, Irigaray persistently emphasizes the 
importance of sexual difference as foundational to any inquiry into 
subjectivity.  
My critique of Spinelli’s existential psychotherapy is limited to 
showing the consequences of his occlusion of sexual difference. My 
emphasis on sexual difference (as I have argued in this thesis) is 
based on Irigaray’s compelling arguments.  Spinelli’s existential 
phenomenological psychotherapy’s occlusion of sexual difference leads 
to several problems that I will now discuss. 
 
5.2 Embodiment without sexual difference  
Embodiment is a crucial concept in the existential 
phenomenological psychology of Spinelli. It fuels his emphasis on 
inter-subjective relations. Echoing Merleau-Ponty, Spinelli states that 
the body is not a thing among other things, but exists as relatedness 
to the world or as “embodied consciousness” (2001, p. 82) and 
expresses “our unique dialogue with the world,” (2001, p. 82). 
Spinelli’s specific understanding of embodiment can also be gleaned 
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from his reliance on the existential philosopher Gabriel Marcel’s views 
on how we take up our relationship to our body. According to Spinelli 
(1997), Marcel posits that our bodies exist “in a ‘borderline zone’ 
between ‘being’ and ‘having’” (p. 187). In other words, “I cannot say 
that my body is me, nor can I say that it is not me – ‘I both am and 
have a body” (Spinelli, 1997, p. 187). Marcel’s assumption is that in 
relation to our bodies, we exist in a ‘borderline zone’ between “being” 
and “having,” irrespective of our specific morphologies. In other words, 
woman is/has a body just as man is/has a body. Both Merleau-
Ponty’s and Marcel’s conceptualizations of embodiments are what 
guide Spinelli in his articulation of his clients’ “self-constructs.” My 
analysis shows that Spinelli’s theory and practice ignores the sexual 
specificity of the body. Nowhere in his writings does Spinelli consider 
sexual difference and its implications. 
From an Irigarayan perspective, ignoring sexual difference vis-à-
vis embodiment is problematic, “as the female and male morphologies 
are the not same and it therefore follows that their way of experiencing 
the sensible and of constructing the spiritual is not the same” 
(Irigaray, 1996, p. 38). It is true that Spinelli does not explicitly 
espouse the idea that male and female morphologies are the same. By 
the same token, however, while he acknowledges that embodiment 
expresses our unique dialogue with the world, he fails to hear the 
sexuate nature of this dialogue. By suspending the question of sexual 
difference, Spinelli implies, for example, that a woman’s relatedness to 
her body is an “individual” problem unmediated by her sex. In other 
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words, embodiment is simply a perceptual problem mediated at most 
by one’s “self-construct.” If embodiment is merely an “individual” 
problem, then its implication for therapeutic praxis is limited to a 
clarification of self-constructs. What this means is that Spinelli’s 
notion of embodiment can motivate the practitioner to focus only on 
the role played by the “existence tensions” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 11) that 
constrict embodiment, rather than on socio-cultural significations. 
Spinelli’s assumption that one’s restrictive “self-construct” 
(sedimentation and habituation of one’s beliefs) is responsible for the 
body’s resistance to change is a simplistic understanding of 
embodiment. 
The following example from Spinelli’s practice regarding his 
client Elizabeth’s struggle with her own relationship to her body as 
she faces terminal illness (lung cancer) will illustrate his restrictive 
understanding of embodiment. A few weeks into therapy, Spinelli 
articulates Elizabeth’s assumptions towards her body and how they 
restrict her relationships. Spinelli wonders whether she can accept an 
“unconditional[ly] loving and respectful relationship” (1997, p. 291) 
towards her body “regardless of whether it (her body) is deemed ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’” (1997, p. 291). Spinelli is alluding to the possibility of an 
unconditional relationship based on her disclosure about her 
experience of tending to her plants. From Elizabeth’s response to his 
queries regarding her conflicted relation to her body, Spinelli surmises 
that although she wishes to accept her body unconditionally and does 
not see doing so as an impossibility, she feels “that there exists for her 
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an obstacle within her relations with her body, with others, and with 
her sense of her own being (i.e. her self-construct), that is not present 
in her relationship with plants” (1997, p. 201). The “obstacle” that 
Spinelli refers to with regard to her body is overlooked in his attempts 
to explore Elizabeth’s “lived experience via her self-construct” (1997, p. 
201). While Spinelli successfully challenges her self-construct and how 
it restricts her interpersonal life, he does not explore the “lived 
experience” of Elizabeth in therapy via her sexuate nature. My point is 
that a change in Elizabeth’s perception of her self-construct alone 
cannot account for how she takes up her own unique way “of 
experiencing the sensible and constructing the spiritual” (Irigaray, 
1996, p. 38). Rather, by listening with an ear for the perceptional and 
sensory language of the client’s body, Spinelli and his client can allow 
for creative possibilities to emerge in their encounter. Instead, Spinelli 
tends to reduce the body “merely to a sociological phenomenon, the 
consequences of socialization and learning” (Grosz, 1989, p. 111), 
which could be explored and challenged within a respectful reciprocal 
relation.  
Spinelli also characterizes Elizabeth’s relation to the plants that 
she tends to as “‘loving’ and ‘near-maternal’” (1997, p. 188). In 
characterizing her relations as maternal, Spinelli appears to be 
colluding with the phallocentric understanding of the mother as one 
who is maternal and nurturing (also known as unconditional love). By 
positioning her in this manner, I wonder whether Spinelli is 
inadvertently creating a space for Elizabeth that allows her to give up 
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being woman so that she could be maternal (and unconditional) in her 
relation to her body and to others. 
According to Spinelli, however, a change in self-construct is 
effected when the client chooses between two attitudes, viz., “I can” 
and “I must.” Briefly, the difference between the two stances are that 
the former “permits openness towards one’s experience… and the 
latter imposes a stance that rejects all options” (1997, p. 193). Spinelli 
assumes that women and men have equal access to such stances. But 
“I can” is not given the same way to men and women within the 
patriarchal tradition. Openness could be understood as openness to 
difference. That is, as Irigaray proposes, “This other, male or female, 
should surprise us again and again, appear to us as new, very 
different from what we knew or what we thought he or she should be” 
(1993a, p. 74). To be surprised, and to appear and be seen as new and 
different, Irigaray maintains that women should be able to have 
access to a position of enunciation. Access to this position of 
enunciation will help with one’s experience of the sensible and the 
construction of the spiritual. Spinelli’s exclusive focus on the 
exploration of the client’s self-construct prevents him from paying 
attention to the sexuation of embodiment. His exclusive focus on the 
self-construct restricts his own approach and precludes him from 
helping the client explore her self-construct as a sexuate being.  His 
“interventions” fall short of giving the client access to a position of 
enunciation that is in line with her sexed subjectivity.  
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5.3 The use of “masculine” metaphors  
In his recent work, Spinelli (2007) characterizes the inherent 
tension that emerges in therapy as daimonic. He borrows this term 
from the American existential psychotherapist Rollo May and tailors it 
to his own purposes.  Spinelli explains, “(T)he ensuing struggle 
between the attempt to maintain the existing worldview and the ‘push’ 
to reconstitute it parallels the depersonalised (or dissociated) 
possessive force of the daimonic” (2007, p. 170). Spinelli also 
describes the manifestations of the daimonic in therapy as “intense 
feelings that ‘spring up’ for the client in ways that may surprise, 
shock, disturb, excite, repel or dismay him or her” (2007, p. 170). In 
the face of such experiences, the therapist’s role, he contends is not 
“to dissolve, reduce, intensify or explain these daimonic explosions” 
(2007, p. 171) but “to attempt to ‘stand beside’ the client throughout 
their appearance and to pursue their investigation through descriptive 
clarification and challenge” (2007, p. 171).  
Spinelli’s utilization of such metaphors to characterize the 
process of existential therapy is problematic. Intense feelings are not 
the same for men and women. In other words, the experience of the 
“intense feelings that ‘spring up’” in therapy are themselves socially 
constructed and so it is incorrect to assume that they are the same for 
both men and women. Once again, a phenomenology of lived 
experience that is not subtended by sexual difference will foreclose 
important nuances and not allow the therapist to be sensitive to such 
differences.  
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Although this daimonic force is perceived as neutral in its 
origin, its outcome (contingent upon the channeling process) can be 
creative or destructive. In this sense, one of the associations evoked 
through this metaphor is madness. In therapy, the task of the 
existential therapist would be to “stand beside” and through 
clarification and challenges sublimate this force to have creative and 
healthy outcomes. Irigaray (1993c) however, cautions us about the 
difference in how men and women take up their relations to madness. 
She asserts:  
This is in fact how the question needs to be posed. 
Each sex has a relation to madness. Every desire 
has a relation to madness. But it would seem that 
one desire has been taken as wisdom, moderation, 
truth, leaving the other sex the weight of a madness 
that cannot be acknowledged or accommodated. 
(1993c, p. 10) 
 
Irigaray also uses the image of the daimonic in her articulation 
of sexual difference. She characterizes the fecundity of the man-
woman couple as “mediumlike, daimonic, the guarantee for all, male 
and female, of the immortal becoming of the living” (1993a, p. 26).  
Unlike Spinelli’s, Irigaray’s use of this term does not have explosive 
and masculine qualities. In general, she characterizes the feminine 
imaginary in fluid terms, as I discuss next through her image of the 
“mechanics of fluids.” 
 
5.4 Irigaray’s response 
How does Irigaray respond to the problems in the theory and 
practice of Spinelli’s existential phenomenological psychotherapy? As 
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to the question of sexual difference, Irigaray maintains, “The natural 
is at least two: male and female” (1996, p. 35), and so any attempt to 
collapse this fundamental difference is to ignore reality. She insists on 
maintaining this difference: not doing so would be unethical. Because 
natural sexual difference is forgotten in our culture, it excludes 
women at two levels: that of sex (for instance, there are few women 
philosophers) and gender (for instance, when men’s ideal of success is 
endorsed for women, too). Both these exclusions are facilitated by the 
use of language. Given this status quo, Irigaray cautions, however, 
that a simple reversal (for example, by making men marginal) is not 
the solution, because “to reverse the order of things, even supposing 
this to be possible, history would repeat itself in the long run” (1985b, 
p. 33). She also resists the temptation to promote hierarchical 
relations between men and women. She insists on the possibility of 
difference without hierarchy. She is careful about repeating any 
phallocratic gestures of mastery and control.  
Sexual difference is the anchor point in resolving any such 
problems. Sexual difference is about recognizing and maintaining the 
space between the two subjects. How does Irigaray do so? She 
explains:  
Who or what the other is, I never know. But 
the other who is forever unknowable is the one who 
differs from me sexually. This feeling of surprise, 
astonishment, and wonder in the face of the 
unknowable ought to be returned to its locus: that 
of sexual difference. The passions have either been 
repressed, stifled, or reduced, or reserved for God. 
Sometimes a space for wonder is left to works of art. 
But it is never found to reside in this locus between 
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man and woman. Into this place came attraction, 
greed, possession, consummation, disgust, and so 
on. But not that wonder which beholds what it sees 
always as if for the first time, never taking hold of 
the other as its object. It does not try to seize, 
possess, or reduce this object, but leaves it 
subjective, still free. (1993a, p. 13) 
 
Irigaray marks this space of sexual difference for “wonder,” because in 
wonder (as in the case of appreciating a work of art) there is no 
crossing over, no consummation, or possession. This does not mean 
that the relation between the two is sterile. Irigaray posits a fecund 
relationship, but one characterized by creativity rather than 
procreativity. From this perspective, the space between man and 
woman is not crossed over even in the sexual act. Understood in this 
manner, sexual difference serves as the foundation of all relations, in 
which the other is an irreducible sexual other. 
This space of sexual difference is also marked by a here and 
now concept of time, for which Irigaray uses a theological term: 
parousia. It is an “expectation of a future not only as a utopia or a 
destiny but also as a here and now, the willed construction of a bridge 
in the present between the past and the future” (Irigaray, 1993a, p. p. 
147). Sexual difference marked by parousia is a future anterior and at 
the same time a not yet. It this paradoxical or elusive quality of sexual 
difference that prompts Irigaray to say, “I am therefore a political 
militant for the impossible, which is not to say utopian. Rather, I want 
what is yet to be as the only possibility of a future” (1996, p. 10). The 
parousiac concept of temporality is not very different from the term 
sensible transcendental. There is an urgency that marks the here and 
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now, which does not exclude the respect and wonder for the here and 
now.  
Irigaray examines the assumptions underlying attempts to 
create an autonomous position for women within the cultural. She 
looks for construction materials that do not evoke masculine images 
of rigidity, solidity, constancy and homeostasis.  For instance, in one 
essay, Irigaray describes feminine sexuality as subtended by an 
imaginary consonant with “The ‘Mechanics’ of Fluids”:  
Yet one must know how to listen otherwise 
than in good form(s) to hear what it says. That it is 
continuous, compressible, dilatable, viscous, 
conductible, diffusible, … That it is unending, 
potent and impotent owing to its resistance to the 
countable; … that it mixes with bodies of a like 
state, sometimes dilutes itself in them in an almost 
homogenous manner, which makes the distinction 
between the one and other problematical; and 
furthermore that it is already diffuse ‘in itself,’ 
which disconcerts any attempt at static 
identification. (1985b, p. 111) 
 
Thus Irigaray shows that the “mechanics of the solids” cannot capture 
the “mechanics of the fluids.” The former lacks the language to 
capture the fluid-like feminine experience. Irigaray establishes the link 
between the mechanics of “solids” and metaphors employed by a dry 
male logic, and juxtaposes them against the “fluidity” of feminine 
speech. 
The formlessness of the fluid however, does not mean that it has 
no form. Grosz observes, “The fluid has no given form on its own but it 
can, of course, be given a form: when placed within a constricted 
space, it takes on the shape of that space” (1989, p. 118). Irigaray’s 
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choice of fluids over solids is underscored by her choice of metonymy 
over metaphor. In a footnote in this essay, she observes that 
metaphors with their reliance on “likeness” cannot do justice to the 
properties of fluid, which is “neither vague nor rigorous in a geometric 
way, it entails an adjustment of meaning which is far from being 
accomplished” (1989, p. 110). Irigaray also cautions that the 
“teleology” of the feminine experience is at stake when “every psychic 
economy is organized around the phallus” (1989, p. 110), thereby 
constraining the articulation of the inter-subjective experience of 
women in normative heterosexual terms.  
In the essay “Body Against Body: In Relation to the Mother,” 
Irigaray (1993c) notes that women’s autonomous position has been 
sacrificed to serve a patriarchal economy of relations. For instance, a 
phenomenological analysis of women in their maternal function would 
reveal that the maternal function subtends “the social order as well as 
the order of desire, but it is always restricted to the dimension of 
need” (1993c, p. 10-1). Irigaray asks, “What is woman, apart from her 
social and material function in reproducing children, nursing, 
renewing the work force?” (1993c, p. 10). Grosz’s comment on this 
situation is apt:  
This is not an effect of nature nor is it a social 
necessity but is the result of women’s submersion 
in maternity and thus her eclipse as woman. It is 
an effect of a social organization which induces guilt 
in those women-mothers who assert themselves as 
women, as autonomous, sexual beings, 
independent of the child or its father. (1989, p. 122) 
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Irigaray posits that for women to be included in the cultural without 
being reabsorbed by phallocentric and patriarchal categories, she has 
to assert her specificity. Her ability as nurturer should transcend the 
material realm. Irigaray asserts:  
Our urgent task it to refuse to submit to a 
desubjectivized social role, the role of mother, which 
is dictated by an order subject to the division of 
labor – he produces, she reproduces – that walls us 
up in the ghetto of a single function. When did 
society ever ask fathers to choose between being 
men or citizens? We don’t have to give up being 
women to be mothers. (1993c, p. 18) 
 
As mothers within the phallocentric and patriarchal order, women are 
exiled from themselves, as they unable to take up an autonomous 
position.  
What does Irigaray advocate in this situation? The answer is 
particularly relevant to existential psychotherapy in its effort to 
articulate a psychic economy in relation to one’s inter-subjective 
experience. 
Inter-subjective relation involves, among other things, dialogic 
communication between two subjects. To have a genuine dialogue, 
Irigaray suggests, we must pay attention to the subject taking up a 
position of enunciation or an autonomous position in relation to 
others (men and women). To accomplish this project, she calls upon 
women to “invent a language,” that is in harmony with their bodies. 
She avers, “If we don’t invent a language, if we don’t find our body’s 
language, it will have too few gestures to accompany our story. We 
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shall tire of the same ones, and leave our desires unexpressed, 
unrealized” (1985b, p. 214).  
The position of enunciation that Irigaray describes also needs to 
encompass another important aspect of the speaking subject, namely, 
the “autobiographical I.” She draws attention to this “I” in her essay 
“The Three Genders” (Irigaray, 1993c). Taking her cue from 
contemporary autobiographical narratives, she states, “This 
transformation of the autobiographical I into a different cultural I 
seems essential if we are to set up a new ethics of sexual difference” 
(1993c, p. 177). A different cultural I would correspond according to 
Irigaray to a subject who is not one but two, that is, a subject who is 
both an “I” and a “You,” expressed in Irigaray’s writings as an “I-she” 
or a “You-he” dialoguing with each other. Dialogue in the inter-
subjective realm that does not respect the cultural other will reduce 
woman to an object status and repeat the phallocentric economy of 
sameness. 
By paying attention to sexual difference, can existential 
psychotherapy benefit from being attuned to creative possibilities that 
emerge as the therapist listens to the body speaking (both one’s own 
and the client’s)? What can Irigaray offer to enhance and revitalize the 
existential psychotherapy of Spinelli? I have already demonstrated 
that by not paying attention to a sexually specific other and by not 
paying attention to the language of the sexuate body, his therapeutic 
praxis has occluded sexual difference. To liberate his praxis from 
inadvertently falling prey to language that uproots the client from 
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his/her own body and history, I venture to offer an alternative mode of 
attending to the client as outlined by Irigaray (1993c). 
In her essay, “Flesh Colors” (1993c) Irigaray attempts at 
thinking through “an elaboration of sexualized subjective identity” 
(1993c, p. 153) in therapy. In another essay, “Gesture in 
Psychoanalysis” (1993c) Irigaray points out that the client is stuck (in 
the past) when he/she is focused on “producing rational speech” 
(Irigaray, 1993c, p. 93), thus remaining a prisoner of the gestures of 
such a speech. I understand this production to be the restructuring of 
meanings in the context of therapy, which is reminiscent of Spinelli’s 
version of therapy (de-sedimenting self-constructs). Irigaray suggests 
however, that we pay attention to the gestures of the body as for 
instance, evidenced in “voice, with its different qualities (timbre, 
intensity, pitch) and colors” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 157). She explains 
that both voice and color as “two components of human identity differ 
according to sex” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 157). In suggesting that the 
therapist pays attention to these two components, Irigaray is offering 
the therapist alternative ways to attend to sexuate embodiment that is 
not in line with a phallic understanding of sexual difference. They 
(voice and color) relate “to the materiality of the human body” (Miller, 
2007, p. 112) and thus resist the phallic logic of sexual difference. In 
the case of colors, for instance, they “do not simply obey binary 
opposition or one of the principles of noncontradiction that control 
every truth according to our logical systems” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 157). 
As regards voice, Irigaray says that the “transitions occur almost 
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imperceptibly” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 158) and that each sex, “retains a 
whole range of sounds whose chords, mediants, and harmonics must 
constantly be discovered or recovered as a personal balance or as a 
relation to the other” (1993c, p. 158). I propose that Spinelli’s practice 
of existential therapy can benefit from paying attention to the gestures 
of the body (both of the client and the therapist) as indicated above, 
and thus remain attuned to a non-phallic understanding of sexual 
difference. If Spinelli were to incorporate this “gesture” of Irigaray into 
his therapeutic praxis, his praxis can be liberated from the hold of a 
phallocentric economy of inter-subjectivity.  
Irigaray also observes that along with paying attention to voice 
and color, therapy could be understood as painting (1993c, p. 155). 
Quoting the 20th century Swiss painter Paul Klee, she states, “The 
point about painting is to spatialize perception and make time 
simultaneous” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 155). In its non-representational 
sense, painting (described in terms of time) attempts at making past, 
present, and future simultaneous. This kind of painting attempts at 
an alternative understanding of time in therapy. In this sense, Irigaray 
states that interpretations (in therapy) can be seen “as the ability to 
compose along with the patient and to help the patient to paint: to 
represent his or her perceptions and form them into a perspective in 
space-time” (Irigaray, 1993c, p. 155). By utilizing an understanding of 
painting that is not merely representational, Irigaray challenges “the 
emphasis in our culture on writing as a medium for meaning” (Miller, 
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2007, p. 112) and by extension, I would add, therapy as an endeavor 
in the restructuring of meanings.  
I end this section with Irigaray’s thoughts on successful 
analysis which could also serve as a bridge to Spinelli’s project of 
existential phenomenological therapy:  
A successful analysis would be the one that 
successfully restores the balance and the harmony 
of the perceptional economy. Pathology can often be 
explained by the fact that certain past events and 
affects are crystallized in the present of the subject, 
and their energy is no longer available. These 
residues must be brought to the patient’s 
perception, they must be made fluid again, put in 
perspective so that creativity can again work freely. 
(Irigaray, 1993c, p. 156)  
 
5.5 Final thoughts 
My research on existential psychotherapy’s forgetting of sexual 
difference has raised complex questions. Racial and cultural 
differences also need to be explored in this context, as does the 
implication of sexual difference for same gender (woman-woman and 
man-man) psychotherapy: for instance, what is being overlooked in 
the inter-subjective realm of psychotherapy between man and man 
and woman and woman? What are implications for psychotherapy 
when this happens? 
Reading Irigaray is never easy. Her writing is complex, her style 
is unique, and her ideas are provocative. I continue to find the 
profundity of the simple truth of sexual difference to be challenging. 
As a male researcher, I have learned from Irigaray the meaning of 
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respect for women from an “inside out” perspective. I am grateful for 
this opportunity. Woman as radical other is not the same kind of 
human being as I am. I believe this reevaluation will serve me well, 
both at a private and a professional level.  Questions about women’s 
subjectivity that I have explored with the help of Irigaray will remain 
open-ended, keeping me poised in wonder. 
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